Riyadh squandered a yearslong lull and fractured the anti-Houthi coalition with its UAE split, experts tell JI — and its new defense partners are hanging back
(Mohammed HUWAIS / AFP via Getty Images)
Fighters loyal to the Houthi authorities, shouts slogans during a rally to recruit more fighters, in Sanaa on September 10, 2026.
Saudi Arabia is facing an escalating Houthi offensive along the Red Sea coast and direct attacks on its own territory, in what regional analysts describe as a turning point in Riyadh’s conflict with the Iran-backed terror group — and a crisis they say was created in part by Riyadh’s own miscalculations.
The Houthis recently gained major ground along the Red Sea, including the port city of Mokha and around the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, and escalated their attacks over the weekend by directly striking Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport.
Regional analysts told Jewish Insider that Saudi Arabia’s current position stems in part from its failure to strategically prepare during a yearslong pause in fighting. Experts say that Riyadh’s rift with the United Arab Emirates has also weakened the anti-Houthi coalition in Yemen, making the challenge more daunting.
Current hostilities follow years of relative calm between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis that Riyadh worked deliberately to maintain. A U.N.-negotiated truce took effect in April 2022 and was extended twice in 60-day increments before formally expiring that October.
After its expiration, “instead of a formal U.N. truce, we had a backchannel between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia that kind of settled the conflict into a de facto truce,” said Allison Minor, director of the Atlantic Council’s Project for Middle East Integration. “Those conversations between the Saudis and the Houthis — there were discussions about what the future of Yemen would look like, the future of Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Yemen, and something certainly kept the Houthis from restarting the fight up until just recently.”
Underpinning that quiet was a broader diplomatic framework aimed at ending the Yemeni civil war, a conflict Saudi Arabia had been involved in for nearly 12 years.
“There was an international consensus around the need to wind down Yemen’s war through an agreement that included the Houthis,” April Longley Alley, a senior fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said. That roadmap, she said, “would have included significant financial advantages for the Houthis in return for a ceasefire and for them being part of a political process.”
Riyadh kept that offer available even after the U.S. first designated the Houthis a foreign terrorist organization in 2021 — a designation revoked by the Biden administration and reinstated last year — and after the group began attacking Red Sea shipping in late 2023.
“The Saudis worked hard to keep the Yemen front quiet,” Alley said. “They kept communicating with the Houthis. They kept this potential for a deal very much on the table, but what we saw was just the limits of that approach.”
Riyadh’s tactic carried a risk that analysts say was well understood at the time: The Houthis have historically treated pauses in fighting as opportunities to strengthen themselves, including during the 2022 truce, Alley said.
Minor said Saudi officials were not naive about the group and had understood that another confrontation was likely, a conclusion she said they reached after the Houthis launched a campaign against Red Sea shipping that the group cast as solidarity with the Palestinians following the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas terrorist attacks. The problem, she said, was what Riyadh did with the intervening time.
“I think that the criticism here is that the Saudis did not do as much as they could have to be prepared for that confrontation with the Houthis once it came,” she said.
Jonathan Schanzer, executive director at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, similarly argued that Riyadh missed an opportunity in the pause in fighting. He noted that an agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, brokered by China in the spring of 2023, also provided Riyadh with time it didn’t take advantage of.
“The Saudis agreed to stop delegitimizing the Iranians in their media, including [the outlet] Iran International, and the Iranians agreed to restrain the Houthis. That was the arrangement that held, until it didn’t hold,” Schanzer said. “There is a legitimate question to ask about whether the Saudis exploited that time appropriately — whether they took advantage of that hiatus in fighting. I think the answer is no. I think they did not manage this time properly, and for that reason the Saudis have themselves to blame in part.”
The clearest evidence of that gap is the current state of the Yemeni forces. After a rift with the United Arab Emirates – which began developing in 2019 over differing visions for Yemen’s political future – recently ruptured, Saudi Arabia moved to consolidate its influence over the Yemeni government and merge its fragmented armed factions under a single command — an effort that was never completed, Minor said.
Attempting to finish that work now, she said, “while an active war is going on, when they’ve already lost significant territory on the west coast, is not going to be easy.”
Alley said Riyadh’s efforts to build deterrence on the ground, conducted in parallel with its diplomatic outreach, failed their first serious test. The Saudis, she said, were “building up the government of Yemen and trying to regroup and coordinate this very factious anti-Houthi coalition after they had in some ways pushed the UAE out.”
“They were trying to kind of have some deterrence on the ground,” Alley said. “But what we saw was that it wasn’t effective in defending Mokha and the Red Sea coast. The Houthis just were more militarily dominant on the ground.”
“I don’t see how you can have Yemeni forces on the ground really effectively confronting the Houthis and holding off further Houthi territorial gains if you don’t at least have Emirati acquiescence,” Allison Minor, director of the Atlantic Council’s Project for Middle East Integration, said. “Obviously, Saudi-Emirati tensions remain quite high, but as the Saudis are going to Egypt, to Turkey, to Pakistan, to the U.S., U.K., I really just feel like Abu Dhabi has to be part of that.”
The split with Abu Dhabi weakened the anti-Houthi coalition at a moment when Saudi Arabia needed it most, Alley said. “The Houthis are one command, one mission, and this other side has a tendency to fight each other.”
Minor said the damage from that rift is still visible in the current fighting. Expectations among Yemenis that government forces would perform better without Emirati involvement “does not seem to have been the case,” she said. The units hit hardest in the Houthi advance on the west coast were those of Tareq Saleh, long backed by the UAE, while forces tied to the Southern Transitional Council have stayed out of the fight.
“I don’t see how you can have Yemeni forces on the ground really effectively confronting the Houthis and holding off further Houthi territorial gains if you don’t at least have Emirati acquiescence,” Minor said. “Obviously, Saudi-Emirati tensions remain quite high, but as the Saudis are going to Egypt, to Turkey, to Pakistan, to the U.S., U.K., I really just feel like Abu Dhabi has to be part of that.”
Meanwhile, Riyadh has been unable to rely on its own partners for help. Despite having signed a mutual defense agreement with Turkey and Pakistan last month, neither has thus far come to Saudi Arabia’s aid. Pakistani officials have said publicly that Saudi Arabia has not activated the pact or specifically requested help inside Yemen.
Analysts said they were skeptical that the pact would hold significant weight even before the current fighting began.
“I was always pretty skeptical that the Mecca agreement would look like NATO Article V in the way that we tend to think about it,” Minor said. “It’s simply not the same. It’s not rooted in superpowers with the capabilities to actually provide a nuclear umbrella.”
Minor said the absence of a superpower guarantor is the defining limitation. Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, she noted, but its officials “have been hesitant about the idea of extending that nuclear umbrella.”
“The Mecca Pact is, in my view, at least right now, a pact that was born of desperation in the face of Houthi and Iranian attacks on the kingdom,” Jonathan Schanzer, executive director at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said. “The notion of Turkey and/or Pakistan intervening on the Saudis’ behalf does not sound likely to me.”
“Simply the lack of a superpower also means that these are essentially middle powers who have much more nuance in their foreign relations and tend to be much more wary of getting involved in armed conflicts, especially outside of their own immediate environs,” she said. “It’s not surprising to me that they haven’t come to Saudi Arabia’s defense.”
The agreement’s real function, Minor said, is likely to be “much more in terms of security cooperation, sharing of technology, arms sales, etcetera, perhaps training and that sort of thing, than it is actively coming to their defense in the way that the U.S. has done for allies and partners in the past.”
Schanzer also noted that the Mecca agreement appeared to be “born out of desperation,” and predicted that Ankara and Islamabad are unlikely to intervene.
“The Mecca Pact is, in my view, at least right now, a pact that was born of desperation in the face of Houthi and Iranian attacks on the kingdom,” he said. “The notion of Turkey and/or Pakistan intervening on the Saudis’ behalf does not sound likely to me.”
“It may end up being a disappointment — there’s not much that they’re going to get out of this that they could take to the bank, so to speak,” Schanzer continued. “I think [Saudi Arabia is] going to find that they are still on their own.”
Alley said the pact appears to function primarily as posturing rather than a true defense mechanism. Still, she said she believes it is “too early” to make a final call on how the alliance will shake out, noting that the region is still at an “inflection point” with its aftermath still to be determined.
Analysts also drew a distinction between defending Saudi territory, which Riyadh’s partners are assisting with, and fighting inside Yemen, which they are not.
“From what I’ve seen, the Pakistanis and the Turks, just like other Saudi allies, are helping with the defense of Saudi territory,” Alley said. “But asking for these countries to help with a war inside of Yemen is just a very different type of ask that would come with pretty significant consequences for a country like Pakistan, who has a significant Shia population in particular.”
Minor said Riyadh’s broader search for backing has produced little. Saudi Arabia “feels that they need a strong international coalition to counter the Houthis,” she said, both for material support and to avoid the international criticism it drew earlier in the war. “But they haven’t been getting a ton of traction there, at least not yet.”
“It seems to me that the bar for U.S. intervention is still really high,” April Longley Alley, a senior fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said. “President Trump in particular, from what we’ve seen from the reporting, is still trying very much to keep this bilateral truce with the Houthis and not to explicitly expand the war, particularly the regional war right now.”
The Trump administration, which declared a ceasefire with the Houthis in May 2025, has so far confined its role to intelligence, logistical support and helping defend Saudi territory, while maintaining direct communication with the Houthis. According to The New York Times, President Donald Trump had considered carrying out military strikes against the terror group over the weekend, however he abruptly called them off.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio, when asked about the Houthi attacks, told Fox News on Tuesday that the United States has a defense agreement with Saudi Arabia and intends to live up to its commitments. But experts said Trump appears “very hesitant” about becoming involved and they do not expect American forces to enter the Yemen war.
“It seems to me that the bar for U.S. intervention is still really high,” Alley said. “President Trump in particular, from what we’ve seen from the reporting, is still trying very much to keep this bilateral truce with the Houthis and not to explicitly expand the war, particularly the regional war right now.”
“Stepping up support — logistical support, intelligence sharing, help with the defense of Saudi territory — is something that I would expect to see,” she continued. “Doing more in Yemen, I think, is a really high bar right now. But you never know with this administration.”
Even defense assistance from Israel is “not off the table” for Riyadh, according to Schanzer, who argued that enlisting help from Jerusalem has “got to be in the back of the minds of Saudi decisionmakers right now.” However, he said the issue is whether Turkey and Pakistan would “put up with such an arrangement.”
Furthermore, Schanzer argued that Saudi Arabia’s problem does not stem from a lack of partners, but rather from a lack of genuine commitments.
“When you look right now at the number of partners that the Saudis have enlisted, at least on paper, to be partners or defenders of the kingdom, it’s actually rather lengthy,” he said. “The question really right now is whether the Saudis, with this help, are going to be able to do much to defend against Houthi attacks and to prevent debilitating strikes on key assets inside the kingdom. And on that, I have to say that I have doubts, because I don’t think that any one of these partners are fully committed to the mission at hand.”
Still, he said many countries are afraid to intervene out of a desire not to join the fight, something that has further hindered Riyadh.
“The fear actually comes from these Western countries that if they begin to help, they also may find themselves under attack — and that is a debilitating factor for the Saudis,” Schanzer said. “There’s not a lot of wiggle room here for them. They need more help than they’re getting, and I don’t see anyone stepping up to give it.”
Analysts said that while Israel could help Riyadh in combating the attacks, any cooperation is likely to be limited and politically fraught
(Mohammed HUWAIS / AFP via Getty Images)
Fighters loyal to the Houthi authorities, shouts slogans during a rally to recruit more fighters, in Sanaa on September 10, 2026.
Saudi Arabia’s escalating conflict with the Houthis has revealed just how challenging it has become for the U.S. to deter the Iran‑backed terrorist group, former officials and regional experts say, as Houthi gains along the Red Sea raise alarms about global shipping and give Tehran fresh leverage.
Analysts said that while Israel could help Riyadh in combating the attacks, any cooperation is likely to be limited and politically fraught.
Saudi Arabia on Tuesday issued an alert for a possible attack on the holy city of Mecca amid escalating strikes by the Houthis, a U.S.-designated terrorist group. A day earlier, Vice President JD Vance said the administration was “on top” of the issue and confirmed the U.S. is in direct talks with the group, following recent clashes between the Houthis and the Saudi-backed Yemeni government in which the Houthis seized the port of Mocha, Perim Island inside the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Hanish archipelago to the north, giving them control of an alternative shipping route to the Strait of Hormuz.
Experts told Jewish Insider the Houthis’ latest advances are the product of years of preparation, Iranian support and a willingness to absorb losses that would force other militias to the table.
“The Houthis have exploited the lack of a cohesive opposition inside Yemen to prepare for this situation, Iran has resumed aiding them with weapons and advisors, and they benefit from only having to fight one foreign enemy at a time,” Jonathan Ruhe, a fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, told JI.
“The Houthis are also very risk-acceptant and willing to tolerate losses that have compelled Iran and other proxies into ceasefires. U.S.-Israeli operations could likely exploit the Houthis’ latest advances, but Saudi air and naval power have never shown any serious capacity to degrade the Houthis militarily.”
Steven Cook, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, said the Houthis have “acquired a lot of weapons and weapons technology from Iran. Yemen’s government-backed forces are not that good. Saudi Arabia and others don’t want to go in on the ground. The U.S. doesn’t want to commit ground forces. Air power can only do so much.”
Edmund Fitton‑Brown, a former British diplomat now at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said the Houthis “have been building and pre-positioning” while the internationally recognized Yemeni government’s forces “are weakened by loss of cohesion, following the dispute over southern secession and the departure of Emirati forces.”
Experts said Houthi advances to capture Mokha and territory near the Bab el‑Mandeb Strait are particularly concerning for Washington and American partners who have counted on the waterway as an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz amid roiled energy markets. Analysts also noted that the disruptions provide Iran leverage in the broader conflict with the U.S.
“It is a concerning development,” Cook said. “Somewhere between 15-20% of global trade passes through the Red Sea … And the Houthis sitting on the Mandeb Strait certainly gives Iran leverage. One of its allies can throttle the global economy.”
“It is important to underline that even if there is an agreement on the Strait of Hormuz, it doesn’t mean that the situation in the Mandeb Strait will be resolved,” Cook added. “The Houthis have their own beef with Saudi Arabia and the current round of fighting is connected to, but not directly related to, the situation in the Strait of Hormuz.”
Ruhe agreed that the advances near Bab el‑Mandeb “give Iran indirect leverage by rattling global markets and threatening the best energy export alternative to Hormuz.” But he emphasized that the Houthis are “far more independent of Tehran than Hezbollah or other proxies,” adding that “they are focused on expanding control inside Yemen and fighting the Saudis, so they prefer not to risk direct U.S. and Israel involvement for the time being, even if Iran might press them.”
In response, Saudi Arabia has reportedly sought U.S. assistance, however, reports indicate President Donald Trump is uninterested in getting involved. Reporting from Israeli media in recent days has also suggested that Saudi Arabia may be quietly exploring potential Israeli assistance as the two countries have established contact through CENTCOM. Analysts said that such cooperation between Jerusalem and Riyadh is possible and would be helpful, but argued it is unlikely to come to fruition.
“[There are] rumors abound about the Saudis asking Israel for help,” Cook said. “It is possible. If the rumors are true and it is now public, I expect vigorous Saudi denials, but the Israelis have capabilities that the Saudis could use. If it happens, I expect that the Israelis will want something in return, which will likely be related to the Palestinians or public acknowledgement of Israeli help.”
Ruhe similarly noted that while Israeli assistance could help Riyadh, he argued that Saudi Arabia is focused on U.S. assistance, stressing that the U.S. and Israel remain “stretched thin” militarily.
“Logically, Israel could assist with military intelligence, which is a particular Saudi weakness,” Ruhe noted, “but Riyadh seems to be looking squarely to Washington for assistance. For now, at least, the U.S. and Israel are stretched thin, and don’t want to divert resources and attention from Iran and other fronts. For the United States, this includes precious air-to-ground munitions and interceptors. Ideally, CENTCOM-led multilateral maritime task forces could assist with freedom of navigation, but this has proven difficult even in less trying times.”
Alexander Gray, who served as chief of staff on the National Security Council during Trump’s first administration, said that he believes the U.S. will ultimately get involved and “provide various types of support” to Saudi Arabia, noting that Washington has “long been a primary security partner of the Kingdom.”
“The Houthi threat is real and serious, primarily to Saudi Arabia, its energy security, and the global commercial traffic going through the Red Sea,” said Gray. “The U.S. has long been the primary security partner of the Kingdom, and President Trump and the Crown Prince have developed a strong relationship that serves the interests of both countries. Ultimately, I anticipate the U.S. will provide various types of support to KSA to ensure that additional strain will not be placed on the global energy supply chain.”
However, some experts warn that Washington’s current approach risks reinforcing the sense that the Yemen front is Riyadh’s problem to manage, rather than a key piece of the wider confrontation with Tehran.
“My biggest concern is that the Trump administration does not seem to understand the extent to which the Houthi problem is part of the larger challenge posed by Iran,” said Matthew Levitt, a senior fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “The administration no longer has a senior special envoy for Yemen, and officials describe the Houthi escalation as a primarily Saudi problem rather than a regional challenge. The Houthis have their own interests, but they are also important members of Iran’s proxy alliance, as evidenced by Houthi cooperation with Iraqi Shia militias in their July drone attack on Saudi Arabia.”
The flare‑up is also the first major test of the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, a NATO-style mutual defense pact signed in August under which Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey guaranteed each other’s defense. However, Islamabad and Ankara have so far stayed on the sidelines.
“The Mecca agreement was never primarily about collective defense against Iran and its proxies, but rather about signaling to Washington, New Delhi, and others,” Ruhe argued. “Over the past year, Riyadh’s growing isolation drove it into the arms of two partners who have their own reasons for joining the Mecca accord, none of which include getting dragged into Yemen’s forever war.”
Fitton-Brown argued that the failure of Pakistan and Turkey to mobilize underscores what several analysts describe as the gap between Saudi Arabia’s ambitions for the pact and its real‑world value when put to the test.
“It reveals it as the loose alliance that it is,” he said. “Pakistan and Turkey have no intention of sacrificing troops in Yemen. The Saudis look desperate: weak in the face of Iran; weak in the face of the Houthis; desperate for help from the Americans, alienated from the UAE, desperate for new allies but those allies are at best fair weather friends. A US-Saudi-Emirati-Israeli reset may be their best bet — the U.S. also badly needs them not to weaken or fail — but it won’t be an easy sell with [Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman].”
Tom Williams/CQ-Roll Call, Inc via Getty Images
Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Roger Wicker (R-MS) arrives for a confirmation hearing in Dirksen building on Tuesday, May 13, 2025.
Good Friday morning.
In today’s Daily Kickoff, we talk to senators about how the Trump administration should address the Houthis deadly attacks on ships in the Red Sea this week despite the terror group’s supposed ceasefire with the U.S., and report on DNC Chair Ken Martin’s dismissal of Zohran Mamdani’s defense of the “globalize the intifada” slogan. We have an exclusive on a bipartisan letter from lawmakers demanding answers from Elon Musk regarding his AI chatbot’s antisemitic screeds, and talk to the family members of fallen IDF soldiers whose bodies are still being held in Gaza. Additionally, we feature a rundown of the who’s who at this week’s annual Sun Valley conference. Also in today’s Daily Kickoff: Larry David, Robert Kraft and Jochanan Senf.
For less-distracted reading over the weekend, browse this week’s edition of the Weekly Print, a curated print-friendly PDF featuring a selection of recent Jewish Insider and eJewishPhilanthropy stories, including: Jewish students forge ahead in attending Ivy League universities, despite fears of antisemitism; Israel shifts approach to Syria’s new government as apprehension wanes; and As teachers unions target ADL and oppose antisemitism bill, Jewish educators sound the alarm. Print the latest edition here.
What We’re Watching
- Fox will air an hour-long interview tomorrow night with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, recorded with Mark Levin during the Israeli leader’s trip to the U.S. this week.
- On Sunday, former Reps. Steve Israel (D-NY) and Peter King (R-NY) will sit with author Daniel Silva at Long Island’s Sid Jacobson JCC to discuss Silva’s latest novel, An Inside Job.
What You Should Know
A QUICK WORD WITH JI’S JOSH KRAUSHAAR
Since Zohran Mamdani won the Democratic nomination for New York City mayor, there’s been a fascinating disconnect between the polls showing Mamdani still vulnerable in the general election and the sclerosis among political leaders unable to make the tough decisions on whether to rally behind an alternative in a bid to stop the socialist candidate from becoming the next mayor.
There hasn’t been much good polling since the primary, but the most recent general election surveys all paint a picture of Mamdani leading the race with a plurality, but far below what a typical Democratic nominee should be receiving after a stunning, come-from-behind defeat of former New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo.
One poll, conducted by the Democratic firm Slingshot Strategies between July 2-6, found Mamdani winning 35% of registered voters, Cuomo at 25%, Republican nominee Curtis Sliwa tallying 14%, Mayor Eric Adams at 11% and attorney Jim Walden at 1%. Thirteen percent said they were undecided.
A late-June poll by the GOP firm American Pulse found Mamdani at 35%, Cuomo at 29%, Sliwa winning 16% and Adams with 14%. Asked whether they were leaning towards voting for Mamdani or anyone but Mamdani, it was close to an even split, with 48% leaning towards Mamdani and 46% preferring anyone else.
Of note, both polls found the combined Cuomo and Adams vote — which roughly encompasses the lion’s share of the moderate Democratic electorate — narrowly outpacing Mamdani’s share of support. In other words, the Mamdani alternative wouldn’t necessarily need a large portion of the Republican vote to prevail.
SEA CHANGE
A top Senate lawmaker indicated on Thursday that he’s open to resumed U.S. involvement in the campaign against the Houthis, amid a ramp-up of the group’s attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Israel that comes two months after the U.S. and the Houthis reached a ceasefire that ended the American bombing campaign against the group, Jewish Insider’s Marc Rod reports.
Notable quotable: “The Houthis need to be totally eliminated,” Sen. Roger Wicker (R-MS), the chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, told JI. “They have no purpose other than to kill free people.” Asked if the U.S. should become involved directly against the Houthis again, Wicker said, “I wouldn’t rule that out.”
Read the full story here, plus additional comments from Sens. Mark Kelly (D-AZ), James Lankford (R-OK), Mike Rounds (R-SD) and Ted Budd (R-NC).












































































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