Readouts from Iran on progress made in the latest round of negotiations with the U.S. are evidence of the regime “simply buying for time” and evidence that Tehran isn’t willing to make the concessions demanded by the Trump administration, Richard Goldberg, a former Trump administration official and senior advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told Jewish Insider in an interview Tuesday.

Following the second round of nuclear negotiations, which Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi called “serious, constructive and positive,” Goldberg made the case for why he thinks there’s a high likelihood of future U.S. military action against Iran, and why he sees the negotiations as diplomatic theater. 

This interview has been condensed and edited for clarity.

Jewish Insider: What is your initial takeaway from the second round of discussions and the Iranian foreign minister’s comments that the parties reached agreements on “guiding principles” for a potential deal? 

Richard Goldberg: If this was operating in a vacuum, and I saw that readout from the Iranian foreign minister, I would tell you that I thought this was a readout of one of the many rounds the regime held with [Special Envoy for Iran under President Joe Biden] Rob Malley or other diplomats from past administrations, Obama or Biden, with the sort of silliness of the readout of “We’ve agreed to terms in principle of what we might talk about.”

It is one of the clearest signs of a regime that’s not willing to make the tough concessions that the president has demanded, and instead is simply buying for time. I think that in their mind, so long as they appear to be the party that wants to talk, that is willing to keep talking, it somehow boxes in the president, politically, from being able to use force. Obviously it does not, but from their perspective, it also is a lifeline to talk like that, because it’s probably the only thing that separates them from financial collapse at this point.

Remember, at the beginning of the year, we saw a bank collapse in Iran, with reports that five other banks were to shortly follow. One of the narrative economic strategies of the regime when they see economic peril is to hold diplomatic talks and to speak positively about those talks and to create a pathway for those talks to extend themselves, because it creates confusion in the market and puts a bottom on the deterioration of the financial system for those who believe that there might be a deal at the end of the rainbow. 

If you were to remove that false optimism, then the bottom drops out. There is no pot of gold waiting at the end of the rainbow. So politically, they think that they’re boxing in the president and delaying military action. Economically, they think they’re staving off financial collapse, but there’s nothing to demonstrate any credible willingness to dismantle all of their threats to the United States and the rest of the world, be that their nuclear program, their missile program, their sponsorship of terrorism and the repression apparatus that we just saw demonstrated at maximum violence. 

In fact, we have seen just [yesterday], while they were talking, reports coming out of a round of more protesters being gunned down the streets at the end of the mourning period for the first slaughter. So I think the president is pretty clear-eyed on all of this. I think he can tell the difference between rope-a-dope and credible concessions. I think he knows when a red line has been obliterated and we should be focused on the fact that force posture continues to build up in the region, and the president has indicated his continued willingness to use force. So all things being equal, it would appear that we remain headed towards the president enforcing his red line.

JI: If these negotiations should fail, what would the military option look like?

RG: Well, no one knows. Obviously, there’s a range of targets that you would be thinking about in Iran. You would start with the greatest threats to the United States, those being nuclear and missile threats, and then you would move into the potential to degrade the regime’s command-and-control communications, the repression apparatus and, of course, the potential for a decapitation strike at the highest level of of the escalation ladder. 

We could also see a quarantine of Iranian oil exports the way that the president had conducted against Venezuela. Again, the regime is trying to project threats right now to deter that specific plan of action. I think that’s why you see [yesterday’s] news of them conducting some sort of military drills around the Strait of Hormuz, threatening to sink U.S. naval vessels, showcasing their missile threat, not just to the United States, but to energy infrastructure in the region. I think they are saber rattling for the oil market and to deter the president from taking action to strangle their financial lifeline. 

So where do you go back to at the beginning? You go back to their missile threat, their drone threat, their naval threat and, if they’re able to already, attempt to blackmail the international community with those threats. Those are threats that are long term and systemic, and we do the United States, our national security, our economic security, a great service by degrading those threats. 

Many of the target sets come back to the same top-tier ones. That which poses the greatest threat to the United States needs to be at the top of the target list. But if you can mitigate those threats and degrade them, then you open up more options to strangle the regime economically by cutting off the oil flow, and you also open up more opportunity to degrade the regime’s control and power via precision strikes, not just by the United States, but potentially by Israel as well.

JI: If the U.S. takes military action, do you think there’s any concern from the American side about the potential fallout in the region? 

RG: The United States has defensive measures to slow an attack and mitigate an attack, and it has a range of offensive capabilities to remove the threat once it has attacked. We have seen the Iranians, both from their territory and via proxies, most specifically the Houthis, launch many of the capabilities that they’re threatening today. We saw a short-range ballistic missile attack against our base in Qatar at the end of the 12-day war [in June]. We have seen other ballistic missile strikes in the past against Iraq after killing [Iranian Gen. Qassem] Soleimani. We have seen the Houthis using anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles and drones to attack the U.S. Navy in the Red Sea over many months — notably, our defenses destroyed all those threats. In the case of the ballistic missile attack on Qatar, I think the public reporting is that we were able to destroy most of the missiles, and those that got through did minor damage – and that’s on the defensive measure side. 

Then comes the offense. If the regime wants to open up that can of worms, attack the United States in that respect, and the attack is mitigated, the next strike will not be one that they come back from. Their goal right now in Tehran is to scare the president, scare the American people, and scare the oil market. 

The objective from military planners inside the Pentagon, for the chair of the Joint Chiefs [of Staff] and for the president should be to stick to reality — What can they do? What do we need to defend against it? What are we going to do to remove those threats from any second or third third wave? What are the clear objectives that we want to have with the outcomes of our strikes that we want to achieve? How are we going to reassure the oil market that energy continues to flow, even if the regime attempts to disrupt flows through the Strait of Hormuz or attacks energy infrastructure? What are the relief valves we have at our disposal throughout the world? – and move in in the best interest of the United States, and I think that’s what the president has shown he’s willing to do.

JI: Iran has indicated that they would retaliate against U.S. military bases in the region in the event of any military intervention. Many Arab allies host American troops and have expressed concern about tensions turning into a wider conflict. What is your read on how Arab countries might be feeling?

RG: If you are a neighboring state that is an ally or partner of the United States, and your neighbor has a large missile and drone force like Iran, and you have critical infrastructure that could be hit by those missiles and drones, you would likely, whether true or untrue, distance yourself from any plans to attack. You’d want to be able to say to your diplomatic counterparts: “We were against this. We cautioned against it. We urged dialogue. We didn’t want to see this happen. Don’t attack us.” 

At a very basic level, that seems obviously what is happening and understandably so, and then there’s also the potential that, in fact, some of these Arab dictatorships don’t mind a weak dictatorship in Tehran that they know rather than having that dictatorship actually fall.

JI: Which path do you think the administration is ultimately going to take?
RG: My suspicion is that the president has already made up his mind. He’s moving in a very specific direction. Everything we see is quite calculated and with specific reason. The regime will not give him a deal that would be viewed as credible and history achieving, and the president, someone who has achieved history in his own action, multiple times by use of limited, but precise military action, will be called to repeat history and create even greater chapters for the history books.

With Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accepting President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan to end the war in Gaza at the White House on Monday, the ball is now in Hamas’ court.

Whether Hamas would agree to release the hostages first, before Israel makes any concessions other than stopping the fighting, remains to be seen. There is also newfound pressure on Qatar, a chief patron of Hamas, to convince the terror group to accept the deal.

The late Israeli elder statesman Abba Eban famously said, “The Arabs never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” In readily accepting Trump’s plan, Netanyahu is counting on Hamas to do just that.

That’s not to say that Netanyahu opposes the plan. His calculus may be that he will be able to execute the parts he supports, while the aspects he finds less favorable are unlikely to materialize anyway — largely, he believes, due to the Palestinians’ own intransigence.

As Netanyahu noted in the press conference, the plan meets all of Israel’s war aims: Bringing back the hostages, dismantling Hamas — most of which Israel already did in the war — and making sure it no longer poses a threat to Israel, through demilitarization and deradicalization. Other elements of the plan that Israel has long said would be part of the “day after” for Gaza are a technocratic government with help from international partners, and the IDF retaining a buffer zone inside Gaza’s perimeter. Netanyahu also reportedly secured 11th-hour edits to the plan regarding the IDF’s withdrawal and Hamas’ disarmament prior to the press conference.

But the details are tricky. 

For example, point 17 of the plan: “In the event Hamas delays or rejects this proposal, the above, including the scaled-up aid operation, will proceed in the terror-free areas handed over from the IDF to the [International Stabilization Force].”

In other words, if Hamas rejects the plan, humanitarian aid “without interference” — likely including dual use items that could be exploited by terrorist organizations — would still be immediately and significantly scaled up and managed by the United Nations and Red Crescent, among others. Once an international force is put together, the IDF would still be expected to retreat from areas in which it has defeated Hamas. And a transitional, technocratic government overseen by Trump and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s “Board of Peace” would be put into place. 

All of that is meant to happen even if the hostages are not freed and Hamas refuses to lay down its arms.

Yet, Trump said that if Hamas rejects the plan: “You know, Bibi, you have the full backing to do what you have to do.” And Netanyahu made clear what that means to him — continuing the war: “Israel will finish the job by itself. This can be done the easy way or it can be done the hard way, but it will be done. We didn’t fight this horrible fight, sacrifice the finest of our young men, to have Hamas stay in Gaza.” 

Arab countries that would potentially take part in the “Board of Peace” and the International Stabilization Fund have said repeatedly that they would not participate in administering Gaza until the war ended, which makes it unclear if, as the plan says, all of that will really happen if Hamas rejects the deal and the war continues.

Then there’s the part of the plan that is most controversial in Netanyahu’s political base: the potential involvement of the Palestinian Authority in governing Gaza, and the creation of a pathway to Palestinian statehood.

“Gaza will have a peaceful administration that is run neither by Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority,” Netanyahu said in the press conference.

Yet the text of the plan says that the Gaza transitional government will only stay in place “until such time as the Palestinian Authority has completed its reform program, as outlined in various proposals, including President Trump’s peace plan in 2020 and the Saudi-French proposal, and can securely and effectively take back control of Gaza.”

The 2020 proposal includes things such as “a constitution … that provides for freedom of press, free and fair elections, respect for human rights for its citizens” and more, as well as “transparent, independent, and credit-worthy financial institutions” and ending incitement. 

Netanyahu said on Fox News’ “Sunday Briefing” that “if all of that is turned on its head, there’s a tremendous transformation … Good luck. Some people believe it happens. I don’t think it’s going to happen.”

The plan also says that the “credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood” would only happen “when the PA reform program is faithfully carried out.” Netanyahu appears to be calculating that Ramallah is unlikely to meet those conditions.

That being said, Netanyahu did sign a document that says unequivocally “we recognize [statehood] as the aspiration of the Palestinian people,” which is disturbing to some on the Israeli right, who argue that even acquiescence in principle is a problem.

While there is significant opposition to the plan from the right flank of Netanyahu’s governing coalition, it has been neutralized for now, in that most of the plan will not go to any kind of vote in the Cabinet. Any attempts to bring the government down over it would have to wait three weeks for the Knesset to come back from its recess, and even then they are likely to fail, with some of the opposition offering Netanyahu a “safety net.”

But as Netanyahu heads back to Israel having said “yes,” plenty of doubts remain as to whether this plan will actually be enacted. First, whether Hamas agrees, and then, new questions and challenges every step of the way.

Two Senate Republicans are urging the administration against lifting any sanctions on Iran in absence of real concessions from the regime, following comments from Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff indicating the U.S. had already rolled back some sanctions.

Witkoff, speaking on CNBC on Wednesday, appeared to confirm that President Donald Trump had lifted some oil sanctions on Iran this week, as a signal of cooperation to China and Iran. Trump also said at the NATO summit that Iran would “need money to put that country back into shape. We want to see that happen,” adding, “If they’re going to sell oil, they’re going to sell oil.”

The comments came after Trump posted on Truth Social earlier this week, “China can continue to purchase Oil from Iran” — comments that a senior White House official said did not indicate any policy shift or sanctions relief.

Sen. James Lankford (R-OK) told Jewish Insider he had heard Trump and Witkoff’s comments and that he was not sure what they were referring to, but said no sanctions should be removed until Iran ends its support for terrorism and guarantees that International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors have access to facilities in Iran.

“We’re trying to get additional details, because we’re hearing the sanctions are still there, as well they should be. They still have acts of terrorism. Until we can actually verify that they’ve actually set aside planting terrorism around the region, we need to continue to be able to put pressure on them,” Lankford told JI.

He said the U.S. should not be removing any sanctions at this point, noting, “We can’t verify anything on the ground yet. … They’re literally trying to be able to block out the future [International Atomic Energy Agency] certification,” referring to an Iranian parliament effort to block IAEA inspectors from Iran going forward.

“We know they don’t have the power and the ability to be able to highly enrich uranium at this point, but we don’t have the ability, still, to be able to verify things on the ground,” Lankford continued. “And we have no shift in their policy, as far as we can tell — and certainly not in their charter — on what their stand is for terrorism in the region and to us.”

Sen. John Cornyn (R-TX) said that sanctions relief should “[depend] on what we get for it. If we get complete denuclearization and a peace between Israel and Iran, that might be worth talking about.”

He said that the U.S. should not remove any sanctions preemptively.

“We should get something for it. Certainly, Iran is back on its heels now, and this is exactly the right time to negotiate some sort of long-standing arrangement,” Cornyn said. “I wouldn’t do anything preemptive.”

It’s spring in Cambridge, Mass. — graduation season — which means that large white tents have started to appear on the leafy quads throughout Harvard Square. 

Until Tuesday, a different kind of tent was still visible in Harvard Yard: small camping tents housing the stragglers who remained in Harvard’s anti-Israel encampment even after final exams wrapped up several days ago. Last week, Harvard suspended student protesters who refused to abide by campus administrators’ orders to disband the encampment, blocking access to their dorms. 

But now, just a week from the start of official university commencement festivities, Harvard has backtracked on its disciplinary action, ahead of the arrival next week of thousands of graduates’ family members, alumni and honorary degree recipients to the Ivy League university. University officials seemed to be saying that Harvard cannot get ready for commencement if Harvard Yard is still gated and locked, accessible only to university affiliates and the handful of people still camped out in protest of Harvard’s alleged “complicity in genocide.” 

In making a deal with the protesters, Harvard interim President Alan Garber joined a growing number of leaders at elite universities who are incorporating protesters’ voices into major university investment decisions and allowing student activists to get off with few, if any, repercussions after weeks of disciplinary violations. Harvard’s dean of the faculty of arts and sciences wrote in a Tuesday email that the outcome “deepened” the university’s “commitment to dialogue and to strengthening the bonds that pull us together as a community.” 

The path Garber took is now a well-trodden one — remove the threat of disciplinary consequences and allow protesters to meet with university trustees or other senior leaders to pitch them on divesting their schools’ endowments from Israeli businesses, a concession that before last month would have been unthinkable at America’s top universities. 

In a matter of days it has become commonplace. Just two years ago, Harvard’s then-president, Lawrence Bacow, responded to the campus newspaper’s endorsement of a boycott of Israel by saying that “any suggestion of targeting or boycotting a particular group because of disagreements over the policies pursued by their governments is antithetical to what we stand for as a university.” 

Northwestern University set the tone two weeks ago when President Michael Schill reached an agreement with anti-Israel protesters in exchange for them ending their encampment. Jewish leaders on campus found the agreement so problematic that the seven Jewish members of the university’s antisemitism committee — including Northwestern’s Hillel director, several faculty members and a student — stepped down in protest. Lily Cohen, a Northwestern senior who resigned from the committee, summed up their concerns: “It appears as though breaking the rules gets you somewhere, and trying to do things respectfully and by the books does not.” 

Her observation has proven prescient as universities negotiate with anti-Israel protesters who break campus rules while they slow-walk reforms long sought by Jewish students — or even avoid meeting with Jewish community members altogether. 

University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Chancellor Mark Mone signed onto a far-reaching agreement with protesters this week that calls for a cease-fire in the war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, condemns “genocide” and denounces “scholasticide” in Gaza and cuts off ties between a university-affiliated environmental NGO and two government-owned Israeli water companies. Meanwhile, Hillel Milwaukee said in a statement that Mone has refused to meet with Jewish students since Oct. 7. Where universities fumbled over statements addressing the Oct. 7 attacks last fall in failed bids to satisfy everyone, many campus leaders have now conceded it is easier to give in to protesters than to stand firm against their rule-breaking. (The president of the University of Wisconsin system said he is “disappointed” by UWM’s actions.) 

Princeton University and Johns Hopkins University made concessions to encampment leaders this week. At Johns Hopkins, the school pledged to undertake a “timely review” of the matter of divestment, and to conclude student conduct proceedings related to the encampment. Hopkins Justice Collective, the group that organized the protests, characterized the agreement as “a step towards Johns Hopkins’ commitment to divest from the settler colonial state of Israel.” 

In a campus-wide email on Monday, Princeton President Christopher Eisgruber said all students must vacate the campus quad where they had organized an anti-Israel encampment. He offered the campus protest leaders an audience with the body that reviews petitions for divestment. Other student groups can also petition for a meeting, he wrote.

Students who were arrested during the course of the protests may have a chance to take part in a so-called “restorative justice” process, whereby the university “would work to minimize the impact of the arrest on the participating students.” If protesters take responsibility for their actions, Eisgruber wrote, the school will conclude all disciplinary processes and allow the protesters to graduate this month. 

At many more universities, top administrators — including university presidents — have met with demonstrators, giving them a chance to air their concerns even when they didn’t reach an agreement. University of Chicago administrators held several days of negotiations with encampment leaders before the talks fell apart and police cleared the protesters. The George Washington University President Ellen Granberg met over the weekend with student protesters who lectured her about “structural inequality” at GW and likened the university’s code of conduct to slavery and Jim Crow-era segregation, according to a video recording of the meeting.

College administrators’ negotiations to end the protests might bring a wave of good headlines and promises of quiet at campus commencements, the largest and most high-profile event of the year for most universities. But students haven’t said what they’ll do when school is back in session next year. 
By promising meetings with university investment committees, the administrators are almost certainly guaranteeing that campus angst over the war in Gaza will not die down. Brown University President Christina Paxson pledged that protest leaders can meet with the university’s governing body to discuss divestment from companies that operate in Israel — in October, a year after the Hamas attacks that killed more than 1,200 people and ignited the ongoing bloodshed in the Middle East.

Correction: This article was updated to more accurately reflect negotiations between Princeton’s president and the protesters.