Following the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, President Donald Trump has taken an unusually open approach toward Damascus, seeking to usher in a new era of stability and regional integration. But that strategy is beginning to face significant tests from jihadist elements embedded within Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa’s own military ranks.

In his second term, Trump has made unprecedented moves to normalize relations with Damascus and promote a new political order in Syria following the fall of the Assad regime last year. During a Middle East visit in May, Trump became the first American president in 25 years to meet with a Syrian leader and announced the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Syria that had been in place for more than a decade. On Nov. 10, Trump hosted al-Sharaa at the White House in a historic visit, during which Syria formally joined the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition. The administration has also sought to broker a security agreement between Syria and Israel.

Despite those efforts, experts warn that Trump’s push for stabilization is increasingly being challenged by the incorporation of jihadist-aligned figures into Syria’s emerging military and security apparatus.

“What my colleagues and I have been warning this entire year is that al-Sharaa was putting his jihadist allies into the new Syrian military without apparent measures to prevent bad things from happening,” said David Adesnik, vice president of research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, who added that those with jihadist beliefs were integrated in “large groups.”

Those concerns were underscored earlier this month, when two U.S. soldiers and one civilian contractor were killed in Syria in an attack claimed by the Islamic State (ISIS) — the first U.S. casualties in the country since Assad’s fall in December 2024. Reports indicated the assailant was a lone gunman who had previously served in Syria’s Internal Security service and had extremist leanings.  

“The ISIS attack that killed U.S. service members and a civilian should be a wakeup call that the terrorist group is still a threat, and will seize opportunities to reconstitute,” said Dana Stroul, director of research at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “So far, the Trump team has tested al-Sharaa’s forces by asking them to go after ISIS threats and the record is fairly positive. But the ‘Defeat ISIS mission’ is not complete.”

While ISIS remains active in parts of Syria — particularly in the country’s northeast, where U.S. forces have long maintained a presence — some experts told Jewish Insider that jihadist figures aligned with al-Sharaa in the new Syrian military are the more immediate challenge to stabilization efforts.

John Hannah, a senior fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, said al-Sharaa’s decision to formally align with the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition has not only provoked ISIS, but also energized jihadist elements within Syria’s ranks.

“ISIS has been relatively quiet since the collapse of the Assad regime. That’s clearly changed over the past couple of months,” Hannah said. “That decision to sign on with a posse led by the Americans against fellow Muslims served as a major provocation — not just to ISIS, but to the broader jihadist community, including fighters now inside Syria’s new formal security structures.”

“There have been deep feuds among jihadis, and al-Sharaa was on one side in a feud against the Islamic State,” said David Adesnik, vice president of research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “Al-Sharaa is also invested very heavily in a better relationship with the United States. The last thing he needs is a guy in his own ranks killing Americans and potentially throwing all of this off.”

In a Truth Social post, Trump vowed “very serious retaliation” to the attack, writing that the Syrian president “is extremely angry and disturbed by this attack.” The U.S. conducted strikes on multiple ISIS targets in Syria last Friday.

Adesnik said Trump’s comments likely accurately “represent al-Sharaa’s views,” noting that ISIS has long been a rival to al-Sharaa within the jihadist ecosystem.

“There have been deep feuds among jihadis, and al-Sharaa was on one side in a feud against the Islamic State,” Adesnik said. “Al-Sharaa is also invested very heavily in a better relationship with the United States. The last thing he needs is a guy in his own ranks killing Americans and potentially throwing all of this off.”

Days after the attack, Trump signed an executive order barring Syrian nationals from entering the United States. The order “adds full restrictions and entry limitations” on Syria “based on recent analysis.”

Stroul said that while this is “not a significant change in U.S. policy toward Syria,” it will be “received poorly by Syrians.”

“On a positive note, the EO clearly acknowledged the work of the one-year-old government in Damascus to address its security challenges, in coordination with the U.S.,” said Stroul. “This suggests that once the U.S. has confidence in the security procedures of Damascus, it could reverse this decision.”

But signs of ideological extremism within Syria’s new military have continued to surface. Shortly before the attack, video surfaced of what appeared to be a group of Syrian army soldiers chanting a jihadist declaration of war against Israel during a military parade in Damascus.

“It should have been obvious quite a while back that there were large groups within the Syrian military that had precisely this belief,” Adesnik said. “It goes back to the fact that [Syria’s new leadership] has integrated a large number of al-Sharaa’s jihadi forces, or aligned jihadi forces, into the military. Being deeply anti-Israel to the point of supporting Hamas is sort of par for the course if you’re a jihadist.”

Adesnik added that such views are consistent with al-Sharaa’s past rhetoric on Israel. Pro-Israel critics of al-Sharaa have pointed to the Syrian leader’s past ties to Al-Qaida, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization and group he joined following the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. While operating for the group as a foot soldier, al-Sharaa was captured by U.S. military forces and imprisoned. He later founded one of the terror group’s Syrian branches.

U.S. officials have played down concerns about Syrian intentions toward Israel. Tom Barrack, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey and special envoy to Syria, told reporters last week that Damascus is not interested in aggression against the Jewish state. But Israeli officials have taken a more pessimistic view, with Israeli Diaspora Affairs Minister Amichai Chikli writing on X that war with Syria is “inevitable.”

“The SDF have been America’s most reliable and effective partner in fighting ISIS for more than a decade,” John Hannah, a senior fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, said. “The logic of incorporating those SDF units wholesale into al-Sharaa’s army and then unleashing them with U.S. backing on the ungoverned spaces of Syria’s central desert where ISIS has found real sanctuary is compelling.”

The White House has aimed to broker a security agreement between Damascus and Jerusalem, in which the Jewish state would relinquish territory it holds within Syria. However, Israel has differed on this approach due to security concerns and a deep distrust of the leadership in Damascus. The two sides reportedly remain far apart on any potential agreement. 

The U.S. currently maintains roughly 1,000 troops in Syria, supported by U.S. air power, and continues to work with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a longtime American partner that has played a central role in combating ISIS. Hannah argued that integrating the SDF into Syria’s new security structures could help counteract jihadist and ISIS influence in the country.

“The SDF have been America’s most reliable and effective partner in fighting ISIS for more than a decade,” Hannah said. “The logic of incorporating those SDF units wholesale into al-Sharaa’s army and then unleashing them with U.S. backing on the ungoverned spaces of Syria’s central desert where ISIS has found real sanctuary is compelling.”

Adesnik echoed that view, calling SDF integration “definitely a good idea,” while cautioning that progress is likely to be slow.

“There was an interim agreement in March, but the odds of that happening in the next few weeks are very low,” Adesnik said. “As long as it doesn’t go completely off the rails, they’ll probably kick the can down the road.”

Despite the challenges to stabilization, Stroul said that U.S. policy toward Syria will likely “remain consistent,” and that she expects the Trump administration to continue embracing the new government in Damascus and al-Sharaa’s leadership. 

“President Trump is about to sign into law the bipartisan NDAA which lifts the sweeping Caesar sanctions against Syria — this was requested by the Trump team and the al-Sharaa government to Congress,” said Stroul. “This is a critical step in sanctions relief that will allow foreign investment to flow into Syria without fear of U.S. punitive action, and is a major signal of support for the post-Assad Syria.”

Stability in Syria could help ease tensions between Israel and Turkey — two countries with competing interests in the region — and the U.S. has a key role to play in shaping the security agreements needed to get there, experts from the Middle East Institute said Thursday during a panel titled “Can Turkey and Israel Find Common Ground in Syria?”

“A lot depends on what the United States decides to do, how they treat the Kurdish question in the northeast of Syria, and what they ask the Israelis and the Kurds to do,” said Natan Sachs, a senior fellow at MEI who focuses primarily on Israel. 

“It’s not that [President Donald] Trump can decide what happens, because these interests, certainly for the Israelis but also for the Turks, are seen as vital domestic interests. It’s not just the question of the peace process in Turkey. For Israelis, it’s seen as vital threats on the Israeli border. But nonetheless, there is enormous room, I think, for [U.S.] diplomacy here with some chance of success.” 

The webinar, moderated by MEI’s vice president for policy, Ken Pollack, also featured Gonul Tol, a senior fellow at MEI who focuses primarily on Turkish politics. It comes against the backdrop of the collapse of the Assad regime last December and Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa’s assumption of power in January. Al-Sharaa addressed the U.N. General Assembly on Wednesday, the first time a Syrian president has done so in almost 60 years, presenting a vision of a “new Syria” after decades of civil war and dictatorship under the Assad family. 

But questions remain about Syria’s future and the influence of its two most powerful neighbors — Israel and Turkey. Sachs and Tol addressed how Syria has become a focal point for Turkish-Israeli rivalry, what role the U.S. could play in softening the hostilities between its two allies and how the situation impacts stability in the region. 

The Assad family “has been a long foe of Israel, but it was a known foe. It was a devil that they knew,” said Sachs, expressing concern that al-Sharaa, who was once a leader in Al-Qaida, could be a “pragmatist, but not someone who’s changed fundamentally.” 

Tol said that “it’s always been Syria that kept the two countries together, historically, from Turkey’s point of view, overlapping interests with Israel in Syria and on some level Iran too.”

“That was the glue that kept the relationship, no matter what was happening on the Palestine question, right? So now we are at a moment where that glue is not there,” Tol continued. “Syria and clashing interests are driving these two countries apart. What is worse is what kept that relationship in the golden years of the 1990s was the fact that Israel really needed Turkey, and it was the main factor behind this bilateral partnership. But in the last several years, Israel has taken many steps that makes Israel a lot less dependent on Turkey. I mean partnership with Ankara granted Israel this legitimacy.”

“So we’ve got a point where there is a dominant Israel that is militarily very powerful … Israel does not need Turkey anymore, and Turkey does not have leverage,” she continued. 

Tol called the Kurdish angle “important” to the situation. “Kurds now want autonomy,” she said. “They are somewhat emboldened by the Israeli presence there [in northern Syria] and as long as Syria remains unstable they won’t be able to send back those refugees.”

She went on to say that the presence of U.S. troops in the country complicates the situation of stabilizing Syria. A potential solution, Tol suggested, is “maybe both sides should just accept different spheres of influence,” similar to Israel and Turkey’s understanding in Azerbaijan. 

“The parties helped there in order to establish a non-conflict mechanism. So you control Turkey’s tens of thousands of troops in northern Syria. So the understanding was going to be, okay, you remain there. We are here. We do our business. So we don’t conflict with each other. Can that be done? I think that would be an ideal scenario for [Turkish President Recep Tayyip] Erdogan, because Erdogan wants Israel out of Syria. But he understands that it’s not realistic,” she said, adding that the two countries would like good relations. “Erdogan is not interested in military conflict with Israel. That is, I know that’s a negative that some have been pushing, but I just don’t think so. And I don’t think Israel has any interest in confronting Turkey’s military either. Turkey is a NATO country at the end of the day, and the stakes are just too high.”

Asked whether Israel can accept a Turkey-Syria agreement, and under what conditions, Tol pointed to recent reports from Israeli media that said one of the asks from the Israeli side in an agreement with Damascus is that it stops cooperating with Ankara on defense.

“We know that Turkey wants to have access to spaces in Syria and Israelis were saying they weren’t going to accept this … but Damascus is slow on that and in a difficult spot, too. So I think the defense angle, if Israelis are pushing that, forcing Damascus to stop having that defense partnership with Ankrara, that would be difficult to follow,” Tol said. 

Sachs said a red line for Israel in a Turkey-Syria agreement would be “Turkish access to [air] bases, and in particular flexibility for aerial defense.”  

“The Israeli assumption here is that Turkey’s influence is almost a given,” said Sachs. “The question is more the confines of that limit, not whether [the countries] come to an accommodation. From the Israeli perspective, the current trend is extremely worrying, with the rise of a regime it is very skeptical of — and with good reason.”