A series of flawed assumptions that Israel held about Hamas for years prior to its Oct. 7 attack preceded its devastating failure to adequately prepare for and defend against the deadly terror attacks by the Gaza-based terror group in which more than 1,200 people were killed and 251 people were kidnapped, according to the findings of a long-awaited IDF inquiry released on Thursday.

The inquiry, one of four released this week that investigated events leading up to and following Hamas’ attacks, found a “broad failure in intelligence gathering and research, across multiple levels and organizations in the knowledge and understanding of Hamas’ strategy, overarching objectives, capabilities, and operational plans over the years.”

Israel’s mistaken assumptions included the view that Hamas in Gaza was a secondary threat, after Iran and Hezbollah, and while Hamas was viewed as “illegitimate,” no effort was made to develop an alternative governing entity.

The military also believed that the main threat posed by Hamas was rocket and mortar fire and thought that Israeli intelligence capabilities, combined with the security barrier between Israel and Gaza and defensive measures, would prevent Hamas from executing a large-scale ground invasion. The barrier itself was not designed to defend against a large-scale surprise attack but rather to control mass protests and smaller infiltration attempts, the army noted.

Israel mistakenly believed Hamas to be “pragmatic” in its daily conduct, valuing its governance in Gaza and committed to stability and “keeping the quiet” while primarily focusing efforts to carry out attacks in the West Bank, according to an IDF summary of its findings. 

Israel operated a conflict management approach in Gaza, aimed at preserving and gradually improving the existing reality, believing that it was possible to maintain prolonged periods of calm, based on the assumption that Hamas was neither interested in nor preparing for a large-scale war. Israel believed that “Hamas could be influenced through pressures that would reduce its motivation for war, primarily by improving living conditions in the Gaza Strip.” In hindsight, the military said, Hamas “systematically employed deception tactics that reinforced this perception.”

The inquiry also identified “a decline in deep familiarity with the enemy’s different worldview, including its culture, religion, language, and history, within both research and intelligence gathering efforts.” 

In addition, Israel was stuck in a loop of periodic military operations in Gaza, described by the IDF as the “Campaign Between the Wars,” under the illusion that Hamas could either be contained or its capabilities gradually weakened without the need for a large-scale military operation.

Following the IDF’s “Guardian of the Walls” operation in Gaza in May 2021, Israel believed Hamas to be deterred and mistakenly thought it had been successful in countering Hamas’ tunneling operations. 

The army concluded in hindsight, however, that Hamas had actually “gained confidence, operational capability, and an opportunity to initiate a multi-front offensive and show of axis-wide coordination.”

On the night between Oct. 6 and Oct. 7, 2023, there were various indications of irregular activity by Hamas — including the activation of Israeli SIM cards by Hamas operatives and unusual military preparations and organizational activity — but intelligence bodies at all levels failed to raise red flags. Multiple intelligence assessments were conducted throughout the night, but the inquiry found that not all available sources were utilized.

The primary challenge on the morning of Oct. 7, the inquiry found, was conducting a situational assessment because Hamas’ early attack on the entire Gaza Division’s sector, including on its headquarters and its forces, led to the division’s collapse for several hours. This, in turn, impacted the decisions made by the Southern Command and the General Staff and the allocation of forces. Many residents in Gaza border communities were left to fend for themselves for hours before any soldiers arrived.

Addressing commanders in a meeting during which the inquiries into the events of Oct. 7 were presented on Monday, IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi — who has already submitted his resignation, effective March 6 — said, “The responsibility is mine. I was the commander of the military on October 7th, and I also carry the weight of your responsibility.” IDF Southern Command head Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman also resigned at the same time as Halevi.

“I believe that an organization or an individual who cannot stand and look failure in the eye will find it very, very difficult to correct their course,” Halevi said. “Since Oct. 7, 2023 — Simchat Torah — I make sure, every single day, multiple times a day, to look failure in the eye. And I tell you: do not try to forget, do not look away. Not from a place of weakness, but with immense strength — because that is how we will become stronger.”