In March, the highly regarded Palestinian pollster Khalil Shikaki set out to survey Palestinian public opinion about the brutal attack carried out by Hamas on Oct. 7. The poll, published by Shikaki’s Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, found widespread support for Hamas: More than 7 in 10 Gazans backed the Oct. 7 attack, nearly two-thirds were satisfied with Hamas’ performance in the war and a majority were satisfied with Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar.

But like so much else about the war in Gaza, Shikaki’s poll results are shrouded in fog.

The official Israel Defense Forces X account, in a post last week carrying the hashtag “busted,” released documents purporting to show Hamas falsified the results of the poll from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research to indicate greater support for the Oct. 7 attacks in Palestinian society. 

Experts, however, told Jewish Insider that allegations that the polling was unreliable is far less dramatic than the military made it seem, with all evidence indicating that the Palestinian public still overwhelmingly supports Hamas and condones the Oct. 7 attacks.

The IDF found a letter in Gaza that the military said indicated that someone named Abu Khaled was manipulating March 2024 poll results without evidence that PCSR Director Khalil Shikaki had any knowledge of the matter.

“The results of the survey were corrected in accordance with the practice that existed in previous surveys … The attached real survey results are confidential and intended for limited circulation,” the letter reads.

The letter indicated that the previously published polling had been altered, on questions ranging from whether Gazans supported the Oct. 7 attack, whether they preferred Hamas to control Gaza after the war, and whether Gazans believed Hamas would win the war.

One notable example of the disconnect between the published results and claims of what the actual data show: The published poll reportedly found that 71% of Gazans supported the Oct. 7 attacks, 62% were satisfied with Hamas’ performance in the war and a 52% majority were satisfied with Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar. According to the letter, the actual results found fewer than one-third (30.7% and 32%) were in favor of the Oct. 7 attacks and were satisfied with Hamas, and less than one-quarter (22%) approved of Sinwar.

According to the IDF, “these documents are part of a systematic process, the purpose of which is to disguise the collapse of the organization and the collapse of public support for it.” 

One of the current Gaza war’s aims is to destroy Hamas’ ability to threaten Israel and to govern in Gaza, such that “the collapse of the organization” would mean a win for Israel, and could be a reason to move towards an end to the war.

But a subsequent PCPSR poll showed otherwise. Rather than a precipitous decline in support for Hamas, the new results were consistent with the published results from March, which the IDF said were faked, showing widespread Palestinian support for Hamas, with a gap in Hamas’ popularity between the West Bank and Gaza.

A PCPSR poll conducted in June showed that 73% of Palestinians supported the Oct. 7 attacks and 79% said Hamas would win the war, while only 2% said Israel would win.

Asked about who should rule Gaza the day after the war, Hamas was still the most popular answer at 61%, though 71% of West Bank Palestinians chose Hamas, while less than half (46%) of Gazans did so. Sinwar enjoyed 65% support — 76% of West Bank Palestinians and 50% of Gazans.

Soon after the IDF published the documents, Shikaki said that it is “highly unlikely” Hamas was able to manipulate poll results and that the claim may be based either on a forgery or an attempt by someone to lie to get money from Hamas. Still, he said that PSPCR would investigate the claim. 

Shikaki told Jewish Insider this week that he has “no doubt of the reliability of our data collectors who worked with us for more than 20 years, [and] zero doubt about the validity of all our polls.” 

PCSR receives the results of each interview immediately after it is conducted, Shikaki said, and as such “we cannot see how the data can be manipulated.” 

The Ramallah-based pollster argued that the IDF’s publication of the documents is “part of the political and psychological warfare between the IDF on one hand and [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu on the other hand,” meaning that Netanyahu also has an interest in making Hamas seem more popular in order to continue the war in Gaza.

“It is a war of narratives that has serious political implications,” he added.

Experts from research institutions with varied political leanings all told JI that while they trust that the IDF is telling the truth about finding the documents in Gaza, they do not share the military’s assessment of what they mean and that most Palestinians still support Hamas and Oct. 7.

Michael Milshtein, head of the Palestinian Studies Forum at the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University, said that he does not doubt the IDF found the documents, but in his assessment, Shikaki is a reputable researcher.

Joe Truzman, a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies specializing in Palestinian terrorist groups, also said that PCPSR is “the most recognized and reported polling organization for understanding Palestinian public opinion.”

Lt.-Col. (Res.) Maurice Hirsch, director of the Initiative for Palestinian Authority Accountability and Reform in the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, told JI that he studied PCPSR polls spanning 15-20 years and found them to be “consistent with what appeared to be the true Palestinian sentiment.” 

Truzman said that “one of Hamas’ ambitions is to position itself as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Consequently, it would be in their interest to manipulate data that portrays them as the most favored organization to lead this representation. The potential impact of such manipulation on the political landscape … is significant and should not be underestimated.”

That being said, Truzman added, the IDF has not provided the evidence needed to substantiate its claims.

“I believe the documents released by the IDF are authentic; however, Israel finds itself in a position where it must provide irrefutable evidence of Hamas’ illicit activities for the international community to recognize the legitimacy of its claims,” he said. “If Israel hopes to have a credible chance of being believed regarding its allegations of Hamas manipulating polling data, it must present a robust and comprehensive case.”

Hirsch noted the IDF gave little explanation of how Abu Khaled in Gaza influenced the PCPSR polling operation in the West Bank, nor did the documents specify if the manipulated results are only from Palestinians living in Gaza or Palestinians in general. 

Even if one assumes the results in Gaza were falsified, Milshtein pointed out, Hamas still enjoys widespread support in the West Bank where the terrorist group apparently did not influence the results. 

Hirsch said that “it’s almost impossible to understand what the IDF is claiming.”

“If this is a one-off event, how did the IDF explain previous results?” Hirsch added. “Are the results of all the surveys published by the PSR in Ramallah tainted with Hamas intervention?”

“The attempt to present a reality in which Hamas does not truly enjoy widespread popular Palestinian support, both as a movement in general and for the Oct. 7 massacre in particular, is a distortion of reality,” Hirsch said.

Milshtein criticized the response to the discovered documents by a number of Israeli and pro-Israel accounts.

“The conversation [about the polls] jumps between two modes: Either we totally believe every poll, or we say the numbers are inflated. There’s no balance, no middle ground where you say … polls are another object in our basket … It’s a question of what data you decide to highlight,” Milshtein told JI.

“People are taking the polls to either mean the whole nation hates Hamas or the Palestinians are not as terrible as we said they were,” he said. “It’s a superficial, stupid conversation.”

The more important question is what are the practical implications, Milshtein said: “How does this become the voice of the public and translate to criticism of Hamas or forcing Sinwar to negotiate? It doesn’t translate. This is a tempest in a teapot, out of context from reality.”