The share of Israelis who believe President Donald Trump is “highly committed” to protecting Israel’s security interests has dropped to a new low, according to a new survey from Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies.

The organization’s July 2026 National Security Survey found that only 14% of Israelis believe the country’s security interests are a top concern for Trump, representing a significant drop from the 35% recorded in March. This continues a downward trend observed as the conflict with Iran drags on, following an Israel Democracy Institute poll released earlier this month that found just 26% of Jewish Israelis believed Israel’s security was a key consideration for Trump – another record low at the time.

The results reflected a broader decline in Israeli faith in Trump, with 60% of respondents indicating that they believe Trump only supports Israel when it serves his own interests, while 23% view him as unpredictable and unreliable on security matters.

The survey also highlighted deep divisions over whether Israel should launch another offensive military campaign against Iran, with 42% of respondents favoring such a move and 46% opposing it. 

Public optimism that another military offensive would achieve key strategic objectives remains low. 

A majority of respondents, 64%, believed another campaign against Iran would only partially dismantle its nuclear program or fail to do so at all, compared to a combined 29% who believed it would fully or mostly dismantle the program. 

Similarly, 65% of respondents said another offensive would yield only partial or negligible results against Iran’s ballistic missile program, while 72% stated that renewed military action would be unlikely to trigger the full collapse of the Iranian regime.

The results represent a major shift from the start of the Iran war, when a large majority of respondents indicated a strong belief that military action would fulfill those objectives. At the onset, 63% of Israelis said they believed Iran’s nuclear program would be significantly damaged or fully dismantled, and 73% held the belief that Iran’s missile program would be severely damaged or taken apart. 

ASPEN, Colo. — Israelis generally don’t grasp the extent of the growing anti-Israel sentiment in the United States, Dahlia Scheindlin, an Israeli public opinion researcher and columnist, told Jewish Insider.

Speaking on the sidelines of the Aspen Security Forum this month hours before more than 100 House Democrats voted to cut U.S. military aid to Israel, Scheindlin said that most Israelis feel that warnings of slipping U.S. support have been repeated for years but haven’t come to fruition.

“Israelis for a long time have been told ‘you have to worry about the America-Israel relationship’ and nothing ever really happened — they sort of took it for granted that the relationship would always be there, and in many ways they still do,” Scheindlin said. “From the Israeli perspective, there’s a little bit of a sense of crying wolf. We see that in the 53% who still think that the relationship will be fine.”

She said most Israelis today view Republicans as pro-Israel and Democrats as anti-Israel and have little understanding of the range of views within both parties. And she said they don’t believe Israel’s own actions have any bearing on U.S. criticism of Israel.

Supporters of opposition parties, she continued, believe that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “personally has undermined the relationship” — but that the issues in the relationship largely end with Netanyahu.

She said that the strong support in Israel for President Donald Trump took a nosedive with the ceasefires in Iran and Lebanon, with many Jewish Israelis feeling that Trump had forced a premature end to the wars and didn’t let the U.S. and Israel carry them to their conclusion or fulfill their main objectives.

But she said that most Israelis still see issues in the relationship as a “disagreement that will pass” rather than a true crisis or turning point. She said a majority of Israelis still feel the U.S.-Israel relationship will survive — and many are too concerned with their own daily lives and the ongoing impacts of the wars in Gaza and Lebanon to give the relationship much thought.

“When you ask about the U.S.-Israel relationship, it’s somewhere between repressing it and complacent and fearful — but also they have been told year after year for quite a long time, ‘Watch out for this relationship,’ and then America continues to come through in so many ways,” she said.

Ahead of the Israeli elections in October, Scheindlin said that Israeli public opinion polling has been relatively consistent for several years, with the current governing coalition lacking a majority of 61 Knesset seats. At the same time, the coalition has recovered from its post-Oct. 7, 2023, nadir of support, and has sat consistently in most surveys between 49 and 55 seats.

“There’s some instability right now, but the basic breakdown that I just said between opposition and coalition has been really extraordinarily stable for almost two years now,” Scheindlin said. “The basic breakdown, where the current coalition has a minority and the opposition has a majority, but can’t form a coalition of only Zionist parties — those basic contours were in place before Oct. 7.”

Even through the popular 2025 war with Iran and the less-popular 2026 war with Iran and killing of Hezbollah’s leadership, the coalition’s polling has changed little, she continued.

“I don’t know what could happen between now and the elections that would give this coalition the additional six to 10% it would need to make up in order to actually win an outright majority of seats,” she said.

At the same time, given the reluctance of opposition parties to create a coalition with Arab parties, they have “constrained their own options,” she said. “It’s a strange situation where the opposition has such a firm majority in all surveys between 65 and 70 seats, mostly, and yet so much of Israeli society has conditioned itself to look only at the Zionist parties in forming a coalition that they don’t have a majority either in most surveys.”

She noted, however, that Gadi Eisenkot, currently the leading opposition candidate, has seemed to leave the door open to partnering with Arab parties.

The much-hyped merger of the parties led by former Prime Ministers Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid hasn’t expanded the size of their bloc nor brought them significant new support.

“It was a small boost in the beginning and then it went back down and now it’s heading closer to where Lapid was polling in surveys even before, which means that most of their supporters are probably Lapid supporters,” Scheindlin said. “Bennett didn’t actually bring very much.”

Scheindlin said that the traditional Bennett constituency — center-right or right-leaning voters who oppose Netanyahu — are now supporting Eisenkot instead.

Scheindlin also told JI that she sees parallels between Israel’s current security strategy of fighting enemies on its own turf as similar to Iran’s own strategy of “forward defense” — comments she repeated on an Aspen panel about the U.S.-Israel relationship, to pushback from fellow panelists.

“The issue of reaching agreements or diplomacy has been so diminished, completely gutted for a long time that even now, when we have the beginnings of a negotiating process with Lebanon … Israelis are very skeptical that that can yield anything,” she said. 

She called the oft-repeated idea that Israel is surrounded on all sides by enemies “demonstrably untrue,” noting that the country has had peace with both Egypt and Jordan for decades, that Iraq, Lebanon and Syria no longer harbor the same animosity or capability to threaten Israel and that Israel has forged new peace deals with Gulf states.

“Are there militias? Are there terror groups? Absolutely. Those are very real,” Scheindlin continued. “But the idea that Israel is surrounded by enemy states that want to destroy it factually, and yet when that’s what you’re being socialized into all the time, then you come to the conclusion that only war is the way to deal with it — which, after Oct. 7, it’s not hard to convince people that the threat is very material and not theoretical.”

Asked about Israeli views on the path forward in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Scheindlin emphasized that there is no clear consensus view among the Israeli public with “minority support” for a two-state solution, a democratic one-state solution, a Jewish-dominated one-state solution or a continuation of the status quo.

She said the dilemma has been exacerbated by the failure of Israeli political leaders to articulate a clear plan or solution of their own. Even though the current government has been open about its interest in annexing the West Bank, she said that leaders have not been clear about what that would mean for the Palestinians living there.

The number of Israelis who believe President Donald Trump views Israel’s security as a central consideration has continued to fall to record lows after Washington signed a memorandum of understanding with Iran, according to a new survey from the Israel Democracy Institute.

The June 2026 Israeli Voice Index, conducted between June 28 and July 1, found that 28% of respondents — including 26% of Jewish Israelis and 36% of Arab Israelis — believe Israel’s security is a key consideration for Trump. 

Among Jewish Israelis, the figure dropped 15 percentage points from a month ago, when 41% of respondents said they felt Israeli security was a key consideration for Trump as his administration engaged in negotiations with Tehran. At the time, those findings marked the lowest levels of Israeli trust in Trump since the research center began tracking the metric when he was elected to a second term in November 2024.

Despite declining confidence in Trump, a majority of Israelis continue to view current tensions between Washington and Jerusalem as temporary rather than indicative of a meaningful deterioration in bilateral ties. Among Jewish Israelis, 54% said current disagreements represent a temporary crisis that will not harm the relationship, while 34% said they mark a longer-term shift for the worse.

Respondents were more divided when asked whether Israel’s strategic security situation was better or worse than it was before the Iran war. Thirty-six percent said Israel’s security situation is now worse, an increase of eight percentage points from April. Meanwhile, 38% said it is better, down six percentage points over the same period.

The survey also found strong support for maintaining an Israeli security zone in southern Lebanon, even if doing so conflicts with U.S. interests. Overall, 72% of respondents backed a permanent security zone in the area. Support was especially high among Jewish Israelis, at 80%, while a majority of Arab Israelis (58%) opposed maintaining a permanent Israeli presence in southern Lebanon.

Beyond military and diplomatic issues, the poll found that rising antisemitism and attacks targeting Israelis abroad were influencing travel decisions. Fifty-six percent of respondents said the threat environment has affected their travel plans, with 41% saying it has impacted where they choose to travel and 15% saying they plan to avoid traveling abroad altogether because of security concerns.

Israelis overwhelmingly believe Iran won the war against the U.S. and Israel and view its conclusion negatively, a new survey by the Hebrew University of Jerusalem has found. 

Over 9 in 10 respondents (92%), surveyed between June 17-20, said Tehran emerged as the victor, according to The Times of Israel, and nearly 70% said President Donald Trump’s management of the war classifies as “failed” or “poor.” 

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu fared slightly better, with 56% of respondents saying his handling of the war was either a failure or poor. 

Nearly all Israelis surveyed (88%) said the country did not achieve its stated goals of ending Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs and bringing down the regime. About half (48%) of respondents said Israel should restart major military action against Hezbollah in Lebanon, even at the risk of clashing with Trump, who has pushed for the fighting to end — while only 21% said they were opposed to such action. 

A vast majority of Israelis are pessimistic about the conflict’s apparent conclusion — 83% said the war with Iran weakened Israel’s long-term security position and 86% have a negative view of the outcome of the war. Nearly three-quarters (73%) of respondents said they did not believe Netanyahu’s claims that Israel made significant progress in the conflict.

The long love affair between Israelis and President Donald Trump, on the rocks over the last few weeks as the U.S. and Iran hammered out an end to the war, appears to be over, with humiliations mounting for Jerusalem. “I call all the shots,” not Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Trump said earlier this month. More recently, the Israeli leader’s bombing campaign in Beirut was “vicious,” Trump said. And perhaps most humiliating of all, Trump suggested that Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa could better take care of Hezbollah than the IDF.

The Israeli public — the spurned lover who once hailed the U.S. president with billboards hung in the center of Tel Aviv reading “Thank you God & Donald Trump” — is not taking it well. Former Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Michael Herzog told JI, “President Trump, who has been a hero to many Israelis, is now openly criticized from within the Israeli government, including Netanyahu’s close circle.”

And this criticism is not only expressed behind closed doors. Channel 14, the popular right-wing outlet that promotes Netanyahu, has been criticizing Trump resolutely, with some of its anchors publicly cursing Vice President JD Vance and the president’s close advisors, White House Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner.

It was not always this way. For most of the time since Trump reentered the White House in January 2025, he has been popular in Israel, with polls consistently showing high ratings for the American president. 

For Israelis, Trump is the one who brokered the hostage-release agreement with Hamas; Trump is the one who made the strikes in Iran and the bombing of the nuclear enrichment facilities in Fordow and Natanz a reality; and Trump is the one who established the Abraham Accords and is willing to expand them, giving Israelis the chance to sunbathe in the UAE, and perhaps in other countries in the Gulf in the near future. And although some won’t admit it, many Israelis also like his tendency to speak very bluntly, and crudely: a president born in Queens, full of Israeli chutzpah.

In recent weeks, the attitude toward Trump among the Israeli public, and the Israeli leadership, has radically and rapidly changed. But this process began even before the signing of the memorandum of understanding with Iran. Over the past few months, time and again, Netanyahu has tried to convince Trump to resume strikes on Iran, only to be rejected. A source familiar with the discourse between the two leaders described to JI a situation that has played out repeatedly since April: the Israeli prime minister explains why only the military option is the correct approach to Iran, while Trump listens but prefers the diplomatic path. 

And then Trump, in his typical fashion, says that Netanyahu will do whatever the U.S. president tells him to do — which has some degree of truth — but is not a good look for a prime minister seeking reelection. Trump has repeatedly criticized Israeli policy in Lebanon and publicly reprimanded Netanyahu for not being responsible enough. When the U.S. president once again floated the possibility that al-Sharaa should handle Hezbollah, which has fired thousands of rockets and drones toward Israel and most recently killed four Israeli soldiers overnight Thursday, the criticism in Israel escalated.

Trump had previously suggested that the Syrians take on Hezbollah, as reported by Kann earlier this week, during an official meeting between the Israeli and Lebanese ambassadors in April, though those in attendance were unenthusiastic about the idea. To understand the Israeli approach toward Trump’s suggestion, one can look at what the chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Likud MK Boaz Bismuth, posted on X: “President Trump, we don’t trust the terrorist Jolani, we have Golani,” referencing a well-known IDF combat infantry brigade.

The opinion within the Trump administration has been made clear. “Trump is the only head of state in the entire world who is sympathetic  to the nation of Israel at this moment and time,” Vance told reporters on Thursday. “If I was in the Cabinet of the Israeli government, I might not be attacking the only powerful ally that I have left in the entire world,” he said. “The problem for Israel is not Donald J. Trump. And anybody in Israel who thinks their biggest problem is the president of the U.S. needs to wake up and smell the reality of the situation that country is in.”

Yet now, after the agreement has been published, the criticism remains unchanged. An Israeli official told JI that the agreement raises several troubling signs, among them: the uncertainty over whether all enriched uranium will be removed from Iran, or only the high-level uranium; under the terms of the agreement, Iran, it appears, will be allowed to enrich uranium at a low level on its soil, meaning it can continue to operate centrifuges; and the issue of oversight is not explained.

“The second shocking thing here is the betrayal of the Iranian people. The second clause in the MOU agreement states that neither country will interfere in the internal affairs of the other. This means the Iranians can execute protesters, and nothing will be done to them,” the Israeli official said. “This entire war started because Trump said that ‘help is on the way,’ and that we would not allow tens of thousands of protesters to be shot and slaughtered. Beyond the concern that Iran will remain a nuclear threshold state, there is also a moral problem here.”

Avner Vilan, a former senior security official and Iran expert, also raised concerns about the agreement. “Iran is receiving a great deal of relief right now, but there is still a long way to go to reach an agreement in the nuclear field. This is an agreement that gives the murderous terror regime in Iran infinite immunity and incentives, allowing it to survive almost indefinitely, while recognizing the strategic significance of Hormuz,” he told JI. 

Vilan also referred to the statements made by Trump in recent days that sparked concern within the Israeli defense establishment. Trump has legitimized Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal, and this, as Vilan points out, despite the fact that Israel defined this threat as an existential threat almost on par with the nuclear one. “This is more disturbing than the state of relations between Trump and Netanyahu, and of course, it doesn’t help that the president calls the State of Israel a ‘very small partner.’ At the beginning of the war, we were a ‘Model Ally.’ Not a small partner,” Vilan notes. “Israel’s point of strength for years was that the way to D.C. goes through Jerusalem. Today, that is no longer the case at all.”

“Israelis expected that the amazing military achievements the U.S. and Israel scored together would be translated into a strong, enduring diplomatic outcome focused on the nuclear issue,” says former Ambassador Herzog. “Instead, the U.S. opted out of the war with a general MOU that focuses on the Strait of Hormuz and the global economy, in return for releasing generous funds to Iran and postponing the core nuclear negotiations. There is little reason to believe that the Iranian regime will now agree to give up the nuclear option or change its orientation, especially as the U.S. military option is taken off the table.”

What looked like a year of celebrating blue, white and red cooperation has been fading more and more in recent weeks. The disappointment among senior Israeli officials is likely intensifying, due in part to the widespread praise that Trump has long received in Israel. It wasn’t for nothing that Trump said last month that he could run in the upcoming elections for prime minister in Israel and win. Even if he were on the ballot, with the thrill now gone, he wouldn’t stand a chance.

The share of Israelis who believe the country’s security is a primary consideration for President Donald Trump has plummeted to a new low, according to a new poll, revealing a sharp shift in public attitudes as the U.S. and Israel diverge on their strategies and ultimate goals of the war with Iran.

The survey, conducted by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute from May 31 to June 5, found that 44% of Israelis believe Israel’s security is a central consideration for the Trump administration, a decline from the 60% recorded in March at the beginning of the Iran war. 

The drop was even more pronounced among Jewish Israelis, where confidence fell 23 points over the same period, from 64% to 41%.

The findings mark the lowest levels of Israeli trust in Trump since the center began tracking the metric when he was elected to a second term in November 2024, highlighting a rapid erosion of Israeli public confidence as the White House intensifies its pursuit of a deal with Iran.

The polling also reveals a stark collapse in public optimism regarding Israel’s ability to achieve its key objectives in the conflict. Roughly one-third — 32% — of respondents now believe the war’s outcome will include the elimination of Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal — down sharply from the 65% who held that view in March. Similarly, the share of Israelis who believe the conflict will weaken the Iranian regime has also been cut by nearly half, falling to 28% (from 55%) over the same period.

This pervasive skepticism aligns with deep public resistance to Washington’s current diplomatic track. Even as the Trump administration continues to seek an immediate cessation of hostilities and a negotiated settlement with Tehran, a majority of Jewish Israelis (58%) maintain that ending the war under its current conditions is fundamentally incompatible with Israel’s long-term security needs.

For many Israelis who were awoken by rocket sirens just before 3 a.m. Wednesday, only to see the headline on their phones that a two-week ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran had been reached, the news was met with mixed feelings of relief and concern.

For most Israelis, the ceasefire has brought tangible relief: an end to regular missile alerts, the prospect of uninterrupted sleep (though Hezbollah swiftly shattered that hope for many on Thursday night), and children back in school. Yet for residents of Israel’s north who continue to live under frequent Hezbollah rocket fire, even this fragile respite remains out of reach.

After the ceasefire went into effect, there was a pervading feeling in Israel that the war with Iran was not complete, and the return to routine life may be short-lived. An overwhelming majority of Israelis supported the war a month after its late-February start, and just over half supported its continuation, according to the Israel Democracy Institute. Those views remained relatively steady after Iran stopped shooting missiles: A poll broadcast on Israel’s Channel 13 news on Thursday found that 51% of Israelis opposed President Donald Trump’s agreement to a ceasefire. 

Israelis’ support for the war effort despite the challenges on the home front was strong because its aims — eliminating the Iranian nuclear threat and severely degrading the ballistic missile threat — were meant to ultimately make them safer, along with the hope, bolstered by statements from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Donald Trump, that the mullahs’ regime would be toppled.

Yet, according to the Channel 13 poll, Israelis ranked their sense of security after the war at 5.36 out of 10, and gave Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a grade of 5.56. Only slightly more Israelis (33%) thought that Israel and the U.S. won the war, as opposed to Iran (28%); a plurality (39%) were not sure.

“Israel did not meet its war aims, and the cost is expected to be high,” Yoav Limor, the main military analyst of Adelson-owned Israel Hayom wrote on Thursday. The Times of Israel’s Lazar Berman lamented that “another war ends without a decisive win.” Even the pro-Netanyahu Channel 14 featured the headline “This is how wars are lost: Stopping a moment before victory” on its homepage, and another, more positive, article about the war’s achievements, still admitted “‘total victory’ was not reached.”

Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid went as far on Wednesday as to call the ceasefire “a diplomatic disaster at a level that I cannot remember. … Of all possible results, Netanyahu reached the worst.” 

Shas leader Aryeh Deri, a Security Cabinet observer and one of Netanyahu’s closest political allies, accused Lapid and others who made similar comments of “acting against the country for narrow, short-term political gain.” 

On Wednesday evening, Netanyahu made a live statement to reassure the public. 

“Iran is weaker than ever, and Israel is stronger than ever,” the prime minister said. “This is the bottom line … We have set the terrorist regime in Iran back many years. We have shaken its foundations. We have crushed it.”

However, Netanyahu added, “We still have goals to complete, and we will achieve them either by agreement or by the resumption of fighting. We are ready to return to combat at any necessary moment. … This is not the end of the campaign; this is a way station on the way to achieving all of our goals.” 

The mixed feelings from the public and the mixed messages from Netanyahu were backed up by experts who spoke to Jewish Insider on Thursday.

Brig.-Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi, chairman of the Israel Defense and Security Forum, told JI that “it’s too early to sum up, because we need to see the results of the negotiations over the next two weeks, and what happens in Iran when the dust settles.” 

Brig.-Gen. (res.) Assaf Orion, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University, said that it is “too early to say” whether Israel is safer now than it was six weeks ago.

“We are at halftime,” Orion said. “The first part was military … but wars are not just a military competition, they are diplomatic and military. …The reality after exhausting the negotiations is how we will judge the war.” 

Brig.-Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi, chairman of the Israel Defense and Security Forum, told JI that “it’s too early to sum up, because we need to see the results of the negotiations over the next two weeks, and what happens in Iran when the dust settles.” 

That being said, Avivi was confident that Israel is safer than before the war began.

“The last six weeks were a huge drama, a total military defeat of a regional power,” he said. “Iran’s military industry, steel plants, petrochemical plants, navy, were almost entirely eliminated. … Essentially, Israel and the U.S. did whatever they wanted for the past month and a half. They attacked wherever they wanted. If they wanted to turn off the country’s electricity, they could have. … [Iran is] crushed militarily and economically.” 

Avivi did not view Israel as having been stopped by the U.S. mid-fight, citing the IDF as saying that they hit all the targets they had defined as important and reached a stage where the remaining targets were energy and economic sites. “That’s why the Iranians broke and wanted a ceasefire,” Avivi said.

“The nuclear project was harmed, but the enriched uranium is still in Iran, and it is unclear if they are closer to giving it up than before,” Brig.-Gen. (res.) Assaf Orion, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University, said. “That needs either a military solution or a deal, or the situation will get worse. … [Iran] may change its nuclear strategy for the worse, because with fewer capabilities, they are more motivated [to break out to nuclear weapons], and the knowledge and materials remain.” 

This was the right time for a ceasefire, Avivi posited, because the fighting had gotten to a point where the remaining targets were Iran’s economic abilities, and the Islamic Republic “basically surrendered,” and decided to agree to the U.S. demand to reopen the Strait of Hormuz without concessions from the U.S.

Orion, however, said that “Israel did very serious damage to Iran [which will last] for many years,” but still viewed the results of that damage as inconclusive.

“The nuclear project was harmed, but the enriched uranium is still in Iran, and it is unclear if they are closer to giving it up than before,” he said. “That needs either a military solution or a deal, or the situation will get worse. … [Iran] may change its nuclear strategy for the worse, because with fewer capabilities, they are more motivated [to break out to nuclear weapons], and the knowledge and materials remain.” 

As for Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, Orion said, “their industry is damaged and unable to produce large quantities … [but] they still retain about half of their capabilities, something like 1,200 missiles and over 200 launchers. It’s clear they can still create the terror effect and harass Israel and neighboring countries. … They can buy [drones] from Russia to threaten the Gulf states.” 

A central question pertaining to Iran’s ballistic missiles and other conventional capabilities, Orion said, is what it will rebuild, how quickly and whether China will help Tehran.

Avivi said he views Iran’s ballistic missile strategy as “totally ineffective, influencing nothing … sporadic and not targeted,” and noted that it did not damage Israeli military capabilities, while “every Israeli strike is a death blow to the regime, its industries or senior officials.” 

As for regime change, which was not an official war aim, Orion argued that it’s too early to know whether it will happen. “Trump said it already happened, but it’s really just a shift change. The [remaining] people are no less extreme,” he said.

Avivi said that reaching a ceasefire with the regime does not undermine the effort to change it: “The people can still take to the streets, and Israeli and American drones can back them up. This regime will crumble in the end, but it’s a process. It won’t happen in a day.”

One major downside of the war for Israel may be a deterioration in U.S. public opinion towards the Jewish state.

“On the one hand,” Orion said, “Israel proved itself as a military partner with capabilities and prowess to significantly help the U.S. with what it wanted to achieve. Israel was there from day one and took on most of the mission of clearing out Iran’s air defenses … It did a lot of the work when NATO didn’t want to.”

However, Orion pointed to a recent New York Times article that portrayed Israel as “dragging the U.S. into the war, even though it was a presidential decision in the end, contrary to the stances of senior [American] figures and public opinion on the left and right. It will take time to see the aftershocks.”

As to whether the ceasefire will last, Orion said that, while nothing is certain, a ceasefire is generally called when both sides “estimate that conditions would be improved by talking,” and noted that at the outset of the war, the Trump administration said it would likely take four to six weeks.

Avivi said that “Israel and the U.S. now have two weeks to regroup and rearm, which Iran isn’t able to do because it doesn’t have a military industry anymore.” 

Iran can spend the ceasefire “taking stock of the disaster that happened to them,” Avivi added.

The war against Iran may have united the vast majority of Israelis who support its aims, but much of the governing coalition’s prewar political obstacles still have to be resolved by the end of the month — including the passing of a state budget for the current year and a Haredi conscription law — or else an early election will automatically be called.

The coalition failed to pass a 2026 budget by Dec. 31, a regular occurrence in Israel, due to several policy disputes. By law, if the Dec. 31 deadline is not met, it may be extended to the end of March. However, if the Knesset does not pass a budget by the end of March, the law states that the body will automatically dissolve, with an election held 90 days later.

The Knesset is slated to go into recess on March 24, but it appears increasingly likely that the legislature will stay in session, with efforts to finalize the budget continuing until hours before Passover, which begins on the evening of April 1.

If Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his coalition succeed in approving a budget, the official election date would be set for Oct. 26, though the parties could choose to hold it on an earlier date. 

Some Israeli media have reported that Netanyahu would prefer to hold the election before Rosh Hashanah (Sept. 12) and the subsequent three weeks of Jewish holidays; other analysts have said he would not want an election after Oct. 7, because the date will serve as a reminder of his government’s failure to prevent Hamas’ 2023 terror attack. 

If the coalition does not succeed in passing a budget, the election will be held at the end of June, and Netanyahu’s Likud party will have to launch a campaign, potentially as the war with Iran is still ongoing.

Before the war, the biggest political challenge for Netanyahu’s government related to issues surrounding Haredi military service.  

The Haredi exemption from the mandatory IDF draft was canceled by the High Court of Justice in 2023, just prior to the Hamas attacks — and shortly before Israelis became acutely aware of the IDF’s urgent manpower needs. Since then, the government has been embroiled in legal and legislative disputes over how many young Haredi men to conscript and what penalties should be imposed on those who refuse to serve.

With the issue unresolved, both Haredi parties quit their Cabinet posts last year, though Shas and parts of United Torah Judaism mostly continued voting with the coalition in the Knesset. Still, the parties demanded that a bill reducing penalties for not serving in the IDF be passed before they supported the budget.

While the head of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Netanyahu loyalist Boaz Bismuth, led the effort to draft legislation that the Haredi parties would agree to — the proposal would institute relatively low enlistment quotas and lessen and defer most penalties for refusing to serve — enough members of Knesset from other coalition parties opposed it that it was unclear that Bismuth’s bill would get enough votes to pass.

Last week, Netanyahu and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich announced that coalition parties agreed to put aside all controversial legislation, including the Haredi draft bill, as well as a reform led by Smotrich to further privatize the dairy sector, which faced significant opposition within Likud. The Haredi parties were reportedly incentivized to drop their insistence on passing the bill when Smotrich and Netanyahu agreed to meet their other budgetary demands.

Dropping the Haredi draft bill means that the status quo remains: The IDF is legally required to send draft notices to all Haredi men aged 18-26, though they do not have to send them all at once, and the government must stop funding yeshivas for young men who are required by law to draft. Yet the government does not plan to enforce the law while the war against Iran is ongoing, Cabinet Secretary Yossi Fuchs told the High Court on Thursday.

Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara flagged some Haredi budgetary demands as illegal, leading the parties to threaten once again to vote against the state budget unless the same amount of funding is diverted to places that Baharav-Miara would not reject. That dispute delayed a vote on increasing the wartime defense budget that had been set for Monday.

At the same time, National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and his Otzma Yehudit party have yet to drop their most controversial proposal, the death penalty for terrorists, which they continue to demand be passed before the budget vote. Otzma has followed through on past threats to vote against the coalition or absent themselves from key votes if their demands are not met.

Ben-Gvir posted a video on X on Wednesday, in which an off-camera voice said, “I heard the Iranians say that you’re dead.” Standing in front of a gallows with a plaque with Israel’s anthem, a memorial to Jewish underground fighters who were hanged by the British Mandatory government, Ben-Gvir said: “I am dying to execute terrorists. Death penalty for terrorists.” 

More than 80% of Israelis support the war against Iran, polls by two major Israeli research institutions found this week, while several U.S. polls found that a majority of Americans oppose it.

The Israel Democracy Institute found that 82% of Israelis — 93% of Jewish Israelis and 26% of Israeli Arabs — support the war with Iran.

Among Jewish Israelis, the war has strong support across the political spectrum, with 76% of respondents on the left backing it, 93% of voters from the center and 97% from the right.

Similarly, the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University found that 81% of Israelis back the war against Iran, and 63% support continuing military efforts until the Iranian regime falls. 

Among Jewish Israelis, support for the war was at 92%, while only 38% of Israeli Arabs support it. About half (49%) of Israeli Arabs oppose the war, while the rest said they did not know. 

According to the IDI poll, three-fourths (74%) of Jewish Israelis said they supported continuing the war until the Iranian regime is overthrown, while only 18% of Israeli Arabs agreed; 61% of Israeli Arabs called for a ceasefire as soon as possible, while only 3% of Jewish Israelis chose that as their preferred option. 

Over a third of respondents (37%) to the INSS poll said that Israelis would be able to live under the current war situation for up to a month, while 29% said they could continue for over a month.

At the start of last year’s Iran war, half of the respondents said it could continue for over a month.

IDI found that most Jewish Israelis (74%) feel protected from Iranian attacks, whereas only 15% Israeli Arabs feel the same. Among Israelis who have a safe room in their homes, 76% feel safe, whereas among those who have to go to a shelter elsewhere, 63% feel safe.

Nearly two-thirds (64%) of Jewish Israelis feel that Israel’s security is a central consideration for President Donald Trump, while only 43% of Israeli Arabs do. 

Meanwhile, in the U.S., a CNN poll, conducted by SSRS shortly after the war began on Saturday, found that nearly 41% of Americans approve of the U.S. military action in Iran, with a sharp divide between Republicans, Democrats and independents — 77% of Republicans approve of the launch of the operation, compared to 32% of independents and 18% of Democrats. The poll found that 59% of Americans disapprove of the U.S. decision to strike.

Similarly, an NBC poll found that 41% of American registered voters approve of Trump’s approach to Iran, while 54% disapprove and 5% aren’t sure. Just 8% of Democrats approve of the president’s handling of the situation, while 79% of Republicans and 28% of independents approve of it. In addition, the poll found that 52% oppose the current U.S. military operation. A sizable majority of Republicans (77%) agree with the U.S. decision to strike Iran, while 89% of Democrats and 58% of independents disagree. 

There is a further divide between self-identified MAGA-aligned Republicans and other Republicans, the poll found: 90% of the former back the strikes, while 54% of the latter support them. The CNN poll found that MAGA Republicans are 30 points more likely than non-MAGA Republicans to strongly approve of the decision to take military action.

A Reuters/Ipsos poll found that just 27% of Americans approve of U.S. strikes — 55% of Republicans, 7% of Democrats and 19% of others. According to the poll, some 56% see President Donald Trump as too willing to use military force to advance U.S. interests — with 87% of Democrats holding this view, 23% of Republicans and 60% of people who don’t identify with either major party.

A Fox News poll found that Americans were evenly split between support and disapproval of the current U.S. action against Iran with Republicans overwhelmingly supportive and Democrats overwhelmingly against. Most American respondents (61%) saw Iran as a “real national security threat,” and only 38% did not.

Less than half of Israelis support joining an American strike on Iran if Israel is not directly attacked, a poll from the Israel Democracy Institute found this week.

Half of the Israelis polled supported a military response only if Israel is directly attacked by Iran, while 44% backed joining an American strike on Iran even before a potential attack on Israel.

Among Israeli Jews, 46% support intervening only if Iran attacks first, while 48% support involvement regardless. 

If those results are further divided between political affiliations, only among Israel’s right does a majority (62%) support joining a preemptive American strike on Iran. On the center-right, 41% support such a scenario, while that number decreases to 35% among centrists, 36% of those polled on the center-left and 31% of respondents who identified as left.

Among Israeli Arabs, 67% would only support an Israeli strike if Iran attacks first.  

Israelis are also split over Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s announcement that U.S. military aid would be phased out in the coming years. About half (49%) think the change would make Israel less secure, while 39.5% think otherwise.

The Israeli right is less likely to think that bringing U.S. military aid down to zero will be harmful to Israel’s security, with only 30% holding that view, while most on the center-right (56%), center (64%), center-left (72%) and left (72%) hold that view.

Most Israeli Jews (54%) believe that President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace will not “help solve the problems in Gaza while maintaining Israel’s security,” while 37% believe it will. When the results are analyzed by political affiliation, a slight majority of those on the left, center and right all agree the Board of Peace will not help.

Among Israeli Arabs, 42% believe the Board of Peace will help and 34% say it will not; 24% did not know. 

IDI conducted the poll on January 25-29 among a sample size of 604 with a margin of error of 3.57%.