Current and former Israeli and U.S. officials suggested that an Israeli strike on an Iranian gas field on Wednesday that prompted the Islamic Republic to strike Qatar was coordinated with the White House, despite President Donald Trump’s claim that the U.S. “knew nothing about this particular attack.” 

Trump made the remarks in a Truth Social post, in which he threatened that the U.S. would bomb the South Pars gas field, the Iranian portion of the larger field shared with Qatar, if Iran does not stop attacking Qatar. 

“The United States knew nothing about this particular attack, and the country of Qatar was in no way, shape or form involved with it, nor did it have any idea that it was going to happen. Unfortunately, Iran did not know this … and unjustifiably and unfairly attacked a portion of Qatar’s [liquid natural gas] facility,” the president wrote.

If “Iran unwisely decides to attack a very innocent, in this case, Qatar,” he added, the U.S., “with or without the help or consent of Israel, will massively blow up the entirety of the South Pars Gas Field at an amount of strength and power that Iran has never seen or witnessed before.”

An Israeli official told Kan News, Israel’s public broadcaster, that the attack on the South Pars gas field was coordinated with the U.S.

Dan Shapiro, the former U.S. ambassador to Israel and Pentagon official in the Biden administration, wrote on X, “Trump can post whatever he likes. But there is zero, I mean zero, chance the IDF would conduct a strike in that location without giving CENTCOM full visibility.”

“Trump knew (and approved),” Shapiro added. “Now he realizes it caused a major escalation with Iran’s (entirely unjustified) attacks on Gulf energy targets.” 

Shapiro later clarified that the Israeli strike “could not have been carried [out] without U.S. knowledge and explicit or implicit approval.” 

“It was predictable that strikes on Iranian energy facilities (by US or Israel) would lead to Iranian strikes on Gulf energy facilities,” he wrote. “There is a narrow window following the Israeli and Iranian strikes, and Trump’s Truth Social Post (untrue, but possibly useful in this context), to de-escalate away from further strikes on energy industry targets in either direction. That will still leave a very challenging situation to unwind, but [it] would be the best near-term development.”

Gilad Erdan, a former Israeli ambassador to Washington and a former member of Israel’s Security Cabinet, told Jewish Insider that it was highly likely the U.S. knew about the strike, saying that Trump did not criticize Israel in his post, and “in the same breath” as saying the U.S. was unaware, “[Trump] himself threatened to erase the [gas] field.”

Erdan noted that the South Pars gas field is “used for Iran’s domestic energy needs [and] doesn’t harm the international energy market.”

“Israel took upon itself to be at the front [of the situation] in my estimation because the field is also Qatari,” Erdan, who is also a senior fellow at the Misgav Institute for National Security, said. “Someone had to send the deterrent message about the energy field to the Iranians, that if they continue, then all options are open against them and they will be hurt badly.” (The writer is a senior fellow at the Misgav Institute and cohosts its podcast.)

Yaakov Katz, an Israeli military expert and author of While Israel Slept: How Hamas Surprised the Most Powerful Military in the Middle East, told JI that he agreed with Shapiro’s assessment. “There is no way Israel would attack such a strategic facility [without coordination] because they know it would draw the Iranians to attack the Gulf states,” he said. 

Katz pointed to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s behavior since the war with Iran began late last month as further indication that Israel was unlikely to make such a move without coordinating with the U.S.: “Why would Netanyahu who behaved so carefully all throughout the war, coordinating with Trump to not upset him so he keeps the war going … do something that would anger Trump and potentially lead him to do something brash and declare the war is over?” 

“It was coordinated, and now Trump is saying what he’s saying to distance himself, but it was done to send a message to the Iranians,” Katz added.

Also Thursday, Saudi Arabia released a statement with the foreign ministers from Azerbaijan, Jordan, the UAE, Bahrain, Pakistan, Turkey, Syria, Qatar, Kuwait, Lebanon and Egypt urging Iran to stop its attacks.

“The participants held Iran fully responsible for the losses and called on Iran to immediately and unconditionally cease its aggression and to comply with UN Security Council resolutions. The meeting also emphasized the dangers of supporting militias and destabilizing security, stressing that Iran must seriously reconsider its miscalculations,” the statement read.

If Iran continues, the foreign ministers stated, there will be “serious consequences for Iran and the security of the region, and will exact a heavy price, casting a shadow over its relations with the countries and peoples of the region, who will not stand idly by in the face of threats to their capabilities.”

Following the Israel-Iran ceasefire and amid questions about the extent of the damage Israel and the U.S. inflicted on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program, an important piece of news flew under the radar: Azerbaijan’s national energy company, SOCAR, finalized its purchase of a 10% stake in Israel’s Tamar gas field. 

The deal and its timing amid hesitation from other countries that have considered investing in Israel, reflect a growing strategic partnership between Jerusalem and Baku — one that has garnered increasing pressure from Iran toward Azerbaijan.

The day after the ceasefire between Israel and Iran was announced toward the end of last month, Union Energy, owned by Israeli businessman Aharon Frenkel, received the final approval from Israel’s Petroleum Council and Competition Authority to sell half its shares of the gas field in the Mediterranean, which provides 60-70% of Israel’s electricity each year, to Azerbaijan’s SOCAR. Chevron owns 25% of the Tamar field and the UAE’s Mudabala owns an 11% stake.

Jerusalem and Baku have had relations since 1992, soon after the latter’s independence from the Soviet Union, and in 2023, Azerbaijan became the first Shi’ite Muslim-majority country to open an embassy in Israel. 

Azerbaijan supplies as much as two-thirds of Israel’s oil, and Israel was the largest supplier of arms to Azerbaijan from 2016-2020. Israel continued to sell drones and missiles to Baku during its war with Armenia over the disputed Nagorno-Karbach region in 2020, as well as satellites and a missile-interception system in 2023, during another war between Azerbaijan and Armenia. 

A 2009 U.S. diplomatic cable posted on Wikileaks described cooperation between Israel and Azerbaijan in terms that are still apt today: The relationship between Jerusalem and Baku is “an iceberg; nine-tenths of it is below the surface,” the cable stated. 

Azerbaijan also shares a 475-mile border with Iran. The cable noted that “much like Israel, Azerbaijan perceives Iran as a major, even existential security threat, and [for] the two countries, cooperation flows from this shared recognition … Even open sources have identified an extensive relationship between the countries’ intelligence services … and it only stands to reason that this remains a major area of cooperation, which both sides naturally seek to downplay.”

Some parts of that relationship have surfaced: for example, that Israel smuggled Iran’s archive out via Azerbaijan in 2018. 

Three years ago, Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev, during a time of tensions with Iran, staged a photo-op of himself stroking an Israeli attack drone, after Tehran accused Baku of allowing Israel to “establish its presence in several regions of Azerbaijan.” 

There had been persistent reports, going back over a decade, that Israel plans to use Azerbaijan’s airbases for a strike on Iran, which Baku and Jerusalem have consistently denied. 

Tehran latched onto that theory at the onset of Israel’s 12-day operation targeting Iran’s nuclear and ballistic-missile programs. 

The day the Israeli strikes began, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry condemned “the escalation,” urging diplomacy, and a day after that, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Ceyhun Bayramov told his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, that Azerbaijan would not be used to attack Iran. 

When the operation ended, IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir said that commandos operated “on the ground,” but the military later clarified he meant in a nearby unspecified country.

On June 26, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said in a call with Aliyev that Baku must “investigate and verify” reports that Israeli drones entered Iran via Azerbaijan. Aliyev denied that his country’s territory was used. 

While the IDF has not publicized the details of every IAF flight to Iran, it has mentioned in its statements the long distances of flights, making it clear that Israel has the capability to fly directly to the Islamic Republic. 

Farid Shafiyev, the chairman of the Baku-sponsored think tank Center for Analysis of International Relations, dismissed the pressure from Iran.

“The latest round of accusations is probably because Iran’s air defense was decimated and not capable of defense. The people in charge, especially the military establishment, are trying to find scapegoats,” Shafiyev told Jewish Insider. “My understanding is that different factions in the Iranian establishment are trying to blame someone outside of Iran for the failures of their military system.”

Shafiyev argued that “if Azerbaijan was somehow a part of [Israel’s operation in iran] it would be known by major intelligence agencies or by the media. It’s fake news.” 

Relations between Iran and Azerbaijan have had ups and downs, such as the attack on Azerbaijan’s embassy in Tehran in 2023, he said, “but lately we have managed to maintain our relationship.” Pezeshkian even visited Baku last week for a regional economic conference, suggesting that the latest round of tensions between the countries may have subsided.

“If Iran were to try to exert pressure on someone, Azerbaijan would be a likely target because of that open relationship with Israel and Azerbaijan’s assets connected to the much larger global [energy] grid, supplying oil and gas to Turkey and Europe, in addition to Israel,” Gabriel Mitchell, the director of undergraduate studies at Notre Dame’s Jerusalem campus and an expert on the intersection between energy and security policy, said.

Gabriel Mitchell, the director of undergraduate studies at Notre Dame’s Jerusalem campus and an expert on the intersection between energy and security policy, told JI that “the dynamic with Iran is very serious.”

“If you consider all of the things that have happened over the 20 months of war [in Gaza],” Mitchell said, “such as [Iranian President Ebrahim] Raisi dying in a helicopter crash [that originated in] Azerbaijan, the escalation between Israel and Iran, and it is no secret the degree to which Israel and Azerbaijan have collaborated on security issues in the last decade and a half, it’s natural for Iran to start pointing fingers.”

“If Iran were to try to exert pressure on someone, Azerbaijan would be a likely target because of that open relationship with Israel and Azerbaijan’s assets connected to the much larger global [energy] grid, supplying oil and gas to Turkey and Europe, in addition to Israel,” he said.

Mitchell noted that there is a large ethnic Azeri minority in Iran, and Iran’s pressure on Azerbaijan also sends a message to that minority to curb any rebellious aspirations.

“Iranian pressure may have nothing to do with Israel and more to do with internal politics,” he added. “It’s impossible for them to flex against Israel right now and they’re not going to act against the Gulf states, so Azerbaijan is a soft middle ground that has a complicated relationship with Iran.”

Despite the ongoing backlash from Iran over ties with Israel, Azerbaijan’s state energy company SOCAR buying a stake in Israel’s Tamar gas field indicates that Baku is not hiding or backing down from a close relationship with Jerusalem.

“SOCAR is not an independent company,” Mitchell said, “so [the deal] is signalling not only to Israel but to the region and the U.S. that Azerbaijan is interested in cooperating with Israel … and wants to be part of broader regional arrangements in a more constructive way.”

The sale of a significant stake in a gas field in the eastern Mediterranean “stands in contrast with anything else going on in the region,” Mitchell said. “Very few companies are interested in making investments in the EastMed natural gas scene right now for understandable reasons, not only because of the war, but … Egypt has economic issues with being able to fulfill payments, which has dampened interest from oil and gas companies in investing in the region.”

“That SOCAR decided to take this leap is rare, and for that reason it should be applauded. It’s only a good thing for Israel,” he added. “I wouldn’t be surprised if other companies saw it as a green light for them to invest.” 

The investment is also likely to benefit Azerbaijan as Tamar is a very reliable gas field, Mitchell said: “Azerbaijan can always say, ‘Set aside geopolitics, we’re just here for the money.’”

“When it comes to Turkey,” said Farid Shafiyev, the chairman of the Baku-sponsored think tank Center for Analysis of International Relations, “Israelis should understand that we are very close, we are military allies … Overall, I think there is room for diplomacy and Azerbaijan can play a role.” 

Azerbaijan had the confidence to invest in the Tamar field, Shafiyev said, “because we believe the conflicts in the Middle East will not cause a major crisis that will make the fields inaccessible.”

The bilateral ties have withstood the souring relationship between Azerbaijan’s strongest ally, Turkey, and Israel, and Baku has at times served as a mediator between them.

“When it comes to Turkey,” Shafiyev said, “Israelis should understand that we are very close, we are military allies … Overall, I think there is room for diplomacy and Azerbaijan can play a role.” 

The Azerbaijan-Israel relationship also remains stable despite the war in Gaza and beyond, Shafiyev said, because it rests on a decades-long foundation. He also cited the longstanding community in Azerbaijan of Mountain Jews, a population that has inhabited the eastern and northern Caucasus since the fifth century.

Roman Gurevich, the Jewish Agency’s honorary ambassador in Azerbaijan, who is well-connected in the government in Baku, said that “the deep-rooted friendship between the Jewish and Azerbaijani peoples has naturally evolved into the warm relationship Azerbaijan now shares with the State of Israel. When the brutal Hamas attack occurred on Oct. 7, [2023], ordinary citizens in Baku brought memorial candles and flowers to the Israeli Embassy in a spontaneous outpouring of solidarity.”

“Regardless of outside pressure or hostility, Azerbaijan remains committed to its friendship and strategic alliance with Israel and the Jewish world,” Gurevich added. “A strong, independent Azerbaijan that honors its friends and knows how to defend its interests is an invaluable ally for Israel.”

As the holiday of Hanukkah – the festival of lights – came to a close last week, it is worth considering Israel’s strategically important partnership with the ‘land of fire’: Azerbaijan. The only Muslim majority country to have friendly, sustained and substantive relations with Israel, Azerbaijan is not only a beacon of religious tolerance with a historical and currently thriving Jewish community, but also an important geopolitical partner just to the north of Iran.

Israel and Azerbaijan cooperate closely in the defense and energy spheres and both share disquiet over the recent Western rapprochement with Tehran. Iran has threatened to annex Azerbaijani territory and bomb its energy infrastructure. Azerbaijani authorities have foiled Iranian-sponsored terrorist plots in their country. So, Israel and Azerbaijan have developed a joint venture to produce drones and Israeli defense contractors supply the Azerbaijani military with state of the art equipment. In return, Azerbaijan’s state energy company, SOCAR, is active in helping to develop Israel’s offshore natural gas fields, while much of the oil imported to Israel is from Azerbaijani reserves.

Due to the ‘miracle of oil’, Azerbaijan has been able to develop and distinguish itself as a ‘Dubai on the Caspian’, spending its energy wealth wisely and emerging as an international player of outsized stature in the former Soviet space. When Russian President Vladimir Putin visited recently, he showed uncommon respect to Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev and was not able to pressure Azerbaijani leaders the way Russian has done in Georgia, Ukraine and even with the United States over Syria. Azerbaijan recently served on the UN Security Council and is very active in a number of other international fora. And, its leaders do not hide their amity with Israel: Azerbaijan’s foreign minister visited Jerusalem this year and on another visit to Washington DC made a point of addressing pro-Israel Jewish organizations.

In Azerbaijan, it is not just the secular state that emphasizes good relations with Israel and discourages anti-Semitism. When asked, average Azerbaijanis express admiration for the accomplishments of the State of Israel and warm opinions about Jews in their country and around the world. Many Azerbaijani tourist guides will make a point of showcasing a major new synagogue in Baku, the country’s capital. President Aliyev regularly congratulates the Jewish community on days of religious significance and when the country’s religious leaders gather, rabbis congregate with imams and priests.

It behooves Israeli leaders and Jewish communities around the world to encourage this relationship, especially now that historical ties to Turkey are in tatters. In fact, Azerbaijan is now the largest outside investor in Turkey, due to a major pipeline project, and it is increasingly wielding influence in the greater Levant region. Azerbaijan is keen to become a technological and telecommunications hub for the Eurasian continent, so Israeli companies could seek partnerships for innovation in that sphere as well as others. Overall, as the nuclear and regional threat from Iran continues to loom large for both countries, Israel and Azerbaijan should continue to provide for their own mutual defense, strengthening an already substantive partnership amongst small nations that know how to seize the initiative.

Dr. Alexandros Petersen is the author of The World Island: Eurasian Geopolitics and the Fate of the West and co-editor of ChinainCentralAsia.com.