After an agreement was reached between Israel and Hamas to initiate the first stage of President Donald Trump’s ceasefire proposal in mid-October, the IDF retreated to an “initial withdrawal line,” leaving Israeli forces in control of 58% of the enclave as Israel and mediators push Hamas to release the remaining deceased hostages and comply with the rest of the agreement, including disarmament and relinquishing power. 

The line divides Gaza in two: an “East,” controlled by the IDF and serving as a buffer zone to Israel, and a “West,” run by Hamas and host to the concentrated Palestinian population.

In interviews with Jewish Insider, experts painted a picture of two Gazas, explaining that the area Israel holds can be used strategically to root out Hamas and maintain leverage if hostilities resume. But challenges lie ahead in rebuilding the enclave and moving Palestinians back into the eastern region.

“There are virtually no Palestinians living in the eastern part of Gaza beyond the yellow line. The eastern part does not see the movement and the maneuvers of Hamas. That’s still confined to the western part,” Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib, a Gaza native and resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, told JI. “Actual civilians of Gaza are all entirely under Hamas’ control in the west.”

Alkhatib said Israel has kept Palestinians from returning to the east over security and operational concerns, but also as leverage.

“How do you ensure that you don’t have Hamas members embedding themselves into the civilians, as they have done time and again? How do you ensure that Gazans coming into the east aren’t hindering clearance operations of tunnels or unexploded munitions?” Alkhatib asked. “I also think that the return of Palestinians to beyond the ‘yellow zone’ is leverage that Israel is holding onto until phase one is thoroughly and fully complete.”

Vice President JD Vance, in Israel last week, said during his trip that Palestinians should be able to move into a “Hamas-free zone” in southern Gaza “in the next couple months.” But experts warned that the timeline will be difficult given the conditions on the ground.

David May, a senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said Israel has developed technology to recognize Hamas fighters and could use it to allow non-combatants access to the area under Israeli control. But even if Israel can vet who enters, eastern Gaza has endured destruction comparable to the west, and serious concerns await displaced civilians.

“The ubiquitous tunnel system that Hamas has dug in Gaza, which no doubt traverses the yellow line that serves as the ceasefire line, limits Israel’s ability to provide a safe zone in the eastern portion of Gaza,” May told JI.

Palestinians who move into the Hamas-free zone and those working on rebuilding would also face the issue of land ownership, Alkhatib noted.

“Who owns these lands, and where do people have their homes? Every plot of land in Gaza is accounted for,” he said. “You can’t just rebuild Gaza without taking into consideration that you’re doing so over pieces of land and properties that belonged to people.”

“There could be a process in which that happens, regardless of any claims to the land,” Alkhatib continued. “Basically there could be a fund established that allows for the compensation of rightful owners. But beyond that, eastern Gaza could be developed to create a compelling example that others in Gaza want to be part of.”

Despite these challenges, experts say finding ways to take in Palestinians to east Gaza could isolate Hamas in the west — a strategy Israel could use to undermine the terrorist group’s authority and bring in international support for rebuilding.

“East Gaza under IDF control would become a Hamas-free zone where the world comes together to support the emergence of thriving new political, social and economic institutions where the lives of average Gazans would flourish,” said John Hannah, a senior fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America. 

“Hamas-controlled west Gaza, by contrast, would be condemned to repression, stagnation and sustained misery. Over time, the east would become a huge magnet for the vast majority of Gaza’s population who would vote with their feet to live within a ‘free Gaza,’ fatally isolating and undermining Hamas rule and legitimacy,” Hannah continued.

May said this contrast can show Gazans “an alternative to life under Hamas’ corruption and oppression” and make donors more likely to contribute to rebuilding projects knowing aid won’t be intercepted by Hamas.

“If there is running water, sewer, electricity, internet, fixed roads and infrastructure, if there is something that resembles jobs and economic opportunity, and you create vetted methods for accepting incoming civilians into that area, then absolutely there could be a way in such that slowly drains the population out of west Gaza,” said Alkhatib.

However, Hannah argued that keeping half the enclave as a buffer zone could also serve Israel’s interests if fighting resumes.

“Right now, Israel controls an extensive buffer zone containing very few hostile Gazans standing between its border communities and Hamas-controlled west Gaza,” said Hannah. “How eager should [Israel] be to attract over a million or more Gazans to pick up and move much closer to Israel’s borders?”

May said Israel may have plenty of time to decide on how to proceed should Hamas continue to be uncooperative with the implementation of the rest of the first phase of the agreement. 

“There is still a lot up in the air,” said May. “As ceasefire lines in the Middle East have a tendency to become permanent borders, Israel needs to plan for the possibility of the yellow line becoming a long-term territorial marker.” 

Daniel Shapiro, a deputy assistant secretary of defense under the Biden administration, U.S. ambassador to Israel under the Obama administration and senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, said in an interview with Jewish Insider on Friday morning that Israel’s strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely halt any further efforts toward a diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear program. 

Shapiro also said that major questions ahead for the region will be if and under what circumstances the U.S. would directly join Israeli strikes on Iran, and whether the strikes prompt Iran to attempt to make a sprint to a nuclear bomb.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Jewish Insider: What are your biggest takeaways from these strikes?

Shapiro: These strikes lay bare the depth of Iran’s miscalculation following Oct. 7. Just stack it up: their top proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah, is gone or deeply damaged. The Assad regime has gone. Their own state-to-state attacks against Israel in April and October were pretty ineffective, and then Israel did significant damage in response last October. 

But since the state-to-state taboo has been broken, Israel demonstrated last night that it has full penetration of the Iranian system and the ability to wreak havoc across the system. Iran really has never looked weaker, and its ability to respond meaningfully is going to be tested. 

So far, they haven’t mustered a very effective response. I’m sure they will. They will continue to respond, but the first wave of 100 or so UAVs was not very effective. 

Now the story doesn’t end here. Israel’s already conducting additional attacks. Iran is going to be very motivated to try to sprint to a nuclear breakout at one of their hardened underground facilities. And the United States, I’m sure, is going to assist Israel with defense against any retaliation. 

But the prospect of a diplomatic resolution that President Trump very much wanted, that would end Iranian enrichment, I think, is pretty much dead, and it’s more likely that he’ll be faced with a decision on whether to use the U.S. capabilities to destroy Iran’s underground nuclear facilities and to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon. 

So that’s a big decision that may be still ahead, and could be the type of dilemma that splits his advisors, his political base, and probably will raise accusations from some corners that Israel is trying to drag the United States into the war.

JI: Let’s say the U.S. doesn’t get involved and doesn’t strike those facilities … What are the implications of that?

DS: The United States has unique capabilities to deal with the underground, deeply hardened sites. It could mean, if the United States is not involved, that those sites survive and are the place where Iran would be, if they chose, trying to execute their nuclear breakout.

That doesn’t mean that’s the only way to address those sites, and so if Israel is intent on really eliminating any threat of a nuclear Iran, it may turn to other methods … I think it’s going to be probably a very intense conversation between Netanyahu and Trump about the pros and cons of U.S. participation.

JI: Do you think that this is going to prompt Iran to move to nuclear breakout?

DS: I think they’re going to be very motivated to try to sprint to a breakout. They’ve often always seen their nuclear program as a pillar of the regime’s survival … If they’re looking for a way to gain a deterrent that would preserve what can be preserved, there’d be a strong case within their system to try to sprint to achieve a nuclear weapon. But there’s also chaos in their leadership right now, because so many of the top leaders were killed last night. So I don’t think that’s a decision that’s necessarily being made immediately.

JI: As we’re looking ahead to potential Iranian retaliation, [how do you think] some of the other states in the region are going to respond? So far, it seems like Jordan [intercepted some] of that first wave of drones … Do you think we’ll see the same sort of coordinated regional response effectively in defense of Israel like we saw last April?

DS: I think countries will act to defend their own airspace and their own assets. I think generally, they will not want to be advertised as participating in a defense of Israel, per se. But that doesn’t mean, even in defending their own airspace, they don’t in some way participate. … 

But I think most of the countries want to distance themselves from this action … They want to not give Iran any motivation or excuse to attack them or to associate them with the strikes … I suspect in private rooms, there’s probably some cheering going on in Arab capitals when they’ve seen the extent of the damage to the Iranian military.

JI: How do you read the response we’ve been seeing from the Trump administration so far?

DS: I think President Trump wanted more time to pursue his diplomatic initiative and to try to reach an agreement. And so I think this was not his preference to have this action take place this soon. 

However, it’s inconceivable Israel didn’t provide some forewarning, and if he didn’t give a firm red light, he probably gave sort of a yellow light. Israel may have argued that Iran was taking, or had taken, or was on the verge of taking some new steps that would shorten the already very short distance to nuclear breakout, or would advance their weaponization research. …

The initial statement from Secretary Rubio was intended to make clear that the United States was not a direct participant, and to try to dissuade Iran from responding in any way against the United States, and to warn them that if they did, it would be a very, very heavy price. …

The big question ahead, as I mentioned at the beginning, is, would the United States, under any circumstances, participate in strikes against Iran? And if so, what would be the trigger for that? Would it be the appearance that Iran is trying to do a nuclear breakout at the Fordow facility? Would it be in response to any kind of Iranian action against U.S. bases?

JI: In an alternate history where Joe Biden or Kamala Harris are in the White House, how do you think they would have handled this? Would they have given the same “yellow light?”

DS: I think it’s impossible to answer the hypothetical without knowing more about the information that Israel may have presented.